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RACE AND POWER POLITICS AS ASPECTS OF
FEDERAL GUARDIANSHIP OVER AMERICAN
INDIANS: LAND-RELATED CASES, 1887-1924
Nancy Carol Carter*
Federal guardianship theories have been used extensively to explain
and justify government control over Indian land and government
intervention into the lives of this country's aboriginal inhabitants.
To fully understand the legal status of Native Americans and of
Indian land, and to appreciate the current pressure from some In-
dians for a return of the land base and sovereign recognition by the
federal government of Indian tribal government,' a study of guard-
ianship is mandatory. The scope of this examination will be limited
to the period during which guardianship matured as a significant
factor in Indian law and will concentrate on land-related cases be-
tween 1887 and 1924-dates representing the passage of the Gen-
eral Allotment Act 2 and the Citizenship Act,3 two axes upon which
federal Indian policy has turned. The principal cases have been
studied for their use of guardianship theory. When required for
understanding and background, cases predating 1887, which deal
with similar issues, are presented.
Land-especially in the context of American greed for it and the
consequent Indian removal-has been at the center of most federal
dealings with Indians. Because the native inhabitants were recog-
nized by the Supreme Court as the ". .. rightful occupants of the
soil, with a legal as well as just claim in it.. .,"4 attempts to con-
struct a legal foundation for the unrelenting acquisition of Indian
land by the United States were necessary. The Constitution offered
only minimal assistance in this respect.5 justice Miller wrote in
United States v. Kagama6 that "[t]he Constitution of the United
States is almost silent in regard to the relations of the government
which was established by it to the numerous tribes of Indians within
its borders. ' 'T The framers of the Constitution did not elaborate on
Indian policy because it had already been established that the pri-
mary responsibility for relations with Indian tribes was in the cen-
tral government.8 Unfortunately, the framers did not specify the
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political status of Indian tribes as either separate nations or as groups
falling under the jurisdiction of the United States-an oversight
which has caused much tortured reasoning and an ambiguous flow
of language from jurists.9
The United States in 1789 did not anticipate the expansion move-
ment that would ultimately consume the breadth of the continent.
Realization came much later that space enough for both white
Americans and the native inhabitants to share the land would not
always exist."" Early government policies directed toward Indian
tribes, then, consisted mainly of minimizing contact by moving the
tribes into the vastness of the westward lands, which it was believed
could be solemnly pledged to the Indians for etemity.1 Cultural
independence and a separate existence were assumed.12 Best exempli-
Eying this early posture of nonassimilation was the government policy
of treating Indian tribes as entities to be dealt with by treaty,13 rather
than looking upon tribal members as citizens to be brought under
the laws of the nation.
After the Indian civilization was engulfed by American expan-
sion,"4 the idea of a separate Indian culture was discredited and
"progressive" thinkers began to espouse an assimilation theory.'3
Enforced acculturation became, for a period, the official policy of
1-he Indian affairs bureaucracy,' but the more humane and gradual
"civilization process" which stressed land ownership and education
evolved as the major tool of the assimilation effort.' 7 Federal power
over individual Indians, while cloaked in the paternalism of better-
ing the lives of a backward and dependent population, solidified
during this post-Civil War time and acquired characteristics still
evident today. No longer did the federal government deal with tribal
entities by treaty.'8 The relationship between government and In-
dian became one of a superior federal power handling the affairs of
the individual.' 9 Indians were deprived of their land base, and the
traditions of a strong tribal affiliation loosened.20 The specter of
federal control which had haunted the Indian from the earliest days
of the American Republic2l ceased to be an apparition and became
a reality. Guardianship was the embodiment of that control.
Early Indian land law cases were instrumental in establishing two
general sources of federal power over Indians-sovereign land owner-
ship and federal guardianship.2 2 Both powers were enlarged by execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial action during the latter nineteenth cen-
tury and further extended after i9oo, but it was guardianship that
offered the greater flexibility and control. The cases between 1887
and 192423 demonstrate that sovereign land ownership and the trust
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responsibility assumed by the federal government over Indian lands
related closely to the growth of guardianship. Important as the land
relationship was, however, federal guardianship as it developed dur-
ing the period studied cannot be said to rest solely on matters of
property. The question is, then, just what did form the foundation
of guardianship as assumed during the years immediately preceding
the passage of the Citizenship Act? The inescapable conclusion pro-
vided by the cases is that raw power, exercised by a strong civilization
over a weakened one, and unashamedly presented in racial terms,
ultimately underpinned federal guardianship over the Indians. Guilt,
benevolence, and genuine compassion for the Indians' plight inter-
twined strangely throughout the subject period, but overriding all,
one concludes, was the brutality of power politics and the belief that
the red race was inferior to the white. In 1823 John Marshall re-
ferred to the treatment of Indians as racially inferior people.2 4 One
hundred years later, the cases demonstrate that perceptions had not
changed. This thesis is best substantiated by looking to the language
of the cases themselves. In the cases studied, government guardian-
ship over Indians was justified by a variety of theories framed within
certain fact situations. The courts seemed to say, "but for this fact,
the power of federal guardianship could not be upheld." However,
one need only proceed through the guardianship cases to find an-
other situation where, although the allegedly critical and dispositive
fact was not in evidence, guardianship powers were still sustained.
One by one, the apparent conditions precedent to the exercise of the
federal power of guardianship were found not to be required at all.
Ultimately only the power of the conquering sovereign and assumed
racial superiority were left as the pegs of rationalization upon which
guardianship hung.
Before tracing the development of the various justifications and
theories used by the courts to uphold and strengthen federal control
through guardianship, it is necessary to discuss the applicability of
private law principles to the guardian-ward relationship of the fed-
eral government and the Indian between 1887 and 1924. The fact
is that private law principles were not applied in any meaningful
way to the relationship, but because of the presumptions raised by
the terminology in the cases, the matter should be discussed. The
study of guardianship cannot be isolated from considerations of
tribal sovereignty and status, nor from questions dealing with the
nature of Indian title and right to land, so these concepts-as pre-
sented in the cases under discussion-will also be explored.
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Application of Private Law to the Federal Government-
Indian Relationship
An understanding of guardian-wardship must begin with the
realization that the relationship existing between the federal govern-
ment and Indians has never evidenced the consistency and legal
status that the application of private trust25 or guardian law could
confer.26 The very use of the terms "trust," "trustee," "guardian,"
and "ward" in Indian law are thus misleading. Such terms imply
recognized legal concepts, yet the enforceable fiduciary duties arising
out of the United States-Indian relationship and the exact nature of
the federal responsibility remain unclear.2
Between 1887 and 1924 the idea of imposing a fiduciary duty-
like that of trustee or guardian in private law2 8 -on the United
States government in its capacity as arbitrator over Indian affairs was
entertained. In the cases studied, the concept surfaced first in the
Court of Claims 29 and then in federal district courts.80 During these
years the courts toyed with the language and logic of private law,
but it was not until 191o that a case squarely confronted the question
of whether the private law of guardian and ward applied to the
measures of the federal government in dealing with its Indian
wards.Y1 The answer was no. 2 This pronouncement came from the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and was reiterated two years later
by the Supreme Court.8
Attempts to analyze the application of private law in these cases
are made difficult by the indiscriminate and interchangeable desig-
nation of the federal government as a trustee and as a guardian. In
private law a trustee and a guardian are distinguishable, although
both are said to be fiduciaries.34 The term "fiduciary," while prob-
ably the most appropriate term for the federal government, was in-
frequently used by the courts. The guardian-trustee distinction was
usually ignored and terminology was applied with little regard for
its aptness according to private law definition or the government
action in question. As a result, the federal government was often
labeled a guardian but given court sanction for the exercise of powers
more characteristic of a trustee. The chart shows some of the dis-
tinctions between the guardian and the trustee as defined in private
law.35
In cases where the United States acted as the holder of legal title
to property managed for the benefit of the Indian, the designation
of the federal government as "trustee" was arguably appropriate.3 0 A
trustee is allowed to fully represent the beneficiary of trust property,
87
and the federal government often assumed a trust responsibility
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Kind of Beneficiary May Maintain a Title in Property
Fiduciary Represented LegalAction of Beneficiary
Guardian Ward Only in representa- Holds no legal title
tive capacity with
ward as an indis-
pensable party
Trustee Cestui que In own capacity and Holds legal title
trust acting alone
over Indian land and tribal funds. 8 In conformity with private law
principles, the federal government was liable for proven breach of
the trust duty and was from time to time sued by Indian bene-
ficiaries.39 Trustees are said to act for the cestui que trust, or bene-
ficiary of the trust. Courts infrequently conformed to this language
when speaking of trust situations. Indian beneficiaries were called
the cestui que trust in only one case studied;40 more commonly the
Indian was referred to as a ward.
In contrast to the trustee, the guardian in private law is said to
hold no legal title to the property which is placed under his charge,
and the guardian is limited to acting in the name of the ward who
becomes an indispensable party to any action for his benefit.41 When
government action rested on the assumption that the Indian was
laboring under a disability, needing special care and protection or
otherwise in wardship status, the term "guardian" was, under private
law principles, more appropriately applied to the government than
was the term "trustee." 42 Because guardians act only in a representa-
tive role and lack capacity to sue in their own right, to term the fed-
eral government a guardian and to apply guardian law was to deny
the government access to the courts except in a representative ca-
pacity with the Indian as a party to the action. Government at-
torneys often ignored this private law distinction and forcefully
argued in numerous cases" that the United States, acting alone, had
capacity to enter court as the Indians' guardian.
The roles, rights, and responsibilities of guardians and trustees
under private law, while distinctly different from each other, particu-
larly as to the holding of legal title and the power of representation
in legal actions, were applied by the courts in apparent disregard of
the differences. Amplifying the problem of correct application was
the traditional misuse of the terms in landmark Indian law cases."4
Incorrect usage appeared as more Indian law cases were decided; as
these cases were quoted and cited as authority, the confusion was
compounded. Besides the contradictory federal stance regarding the
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legal nature of its duty, plenary power justifications and political con-
siderations intervened to prevent the use of private law to measure
the federal government's conduct in dealings with the Indians. The
increasing tendency to term the federal power over Indians as
plenary 5 reduced the need to find a private law basis or justification
for federal action vis-a-vis the Indians. Plenary power, being full and
complete, could not be limited by accepted principles of private law.
Moreover, the courts could have found themselves in an untenable
political position had they attempted to impose the strict rules of
trustee and guardian law upon the legislative branch of government.
Both trustees and guardians are expected to work for their bene-
ficiaries with single-minded loyalty and to eschew private gain." It
is difficult to see how congressional actions, particularly those which
relieved the Indian tribes of large land holdings, could have met this
strict test. Further tensions and constitutional questions would have
arisen if the courts had accepted the private law guardian principle
that the guardian, normally appointed by the court, is regarded as
an officer of the court and often must have court approval before he
acts.47 The Supreme Court consistently disclaimed any such au-
thority48 by stating that the power of Congress over Indians was not
subject to control by the courts.49 Application of strict private law
principles to the United States in its dealings with the Indians was
thus doomed by practical, political, and constitutional considera-
tions. The following case discussions demonstrate the misuse of
terminology and the timid rise and ultimate rejection of the appli-
cation of private law in Indian cases decided between 1887 and 1924.
In Chicksaw Nation v. United States,50 the Court of Claims ap-
plied some elements of fiduciary law and referred to the federal gov-
ernment as both a trustee and a guardian, while denying that the
rules of law applicable to controversies between the United States
and the Indian tribes were as strict as those governing differences
between private guardians and wards.5' The Court broadened the
government's treaty and self-imposed responsibility as "more im-
portant in essence than that of trustees to cestui qui trust, or even
that of guardian and ward," urging that, in effect, it resembled "the
relation of parent and child. 52 Both cestui que trust and ward
terminology were, however, used to describe the Indian. The trust
responsibility was termed "peculiar" and personal in nature.58 Re-
luctance to assess interest on an unauthorized government disburse-
ment of Chickasaw tribal trust funds could explain the Court's fail-
ure to apply trust law in a strict fashion to the government. That the
interest would be due in an action between individuals, the Court
had no doubt, but on the theory that the sovereign does no wrong,
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the Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the interest
assessment and referred the matter to Congress.54 Six years later, the
Court of Claims did allow interest on a Shawnee claim, 51 but hedged
straight trust law application by not calculating the interest accord-
ing to "the strict rule of the common law."56 In entering judgment
against the United States, the Court found that as trustees and
guardians the government was liable where it had breached its duty.57
Liability was established in language like that of private trust law:
"... a guardian cannot excuse a breach of trust because of the em-
ployment by him of an incompetent or dishonest agent"58 who,
while acting in the scope of his employment, harms the beneficial
interest.
Federal district (circuit) courts applied elements of fiduciary law
to reach results favorable to the federal government as plaintiff and
guardian or trustee of Indian interests. In 1895, two cases arose from
United States efforts to set aside conveyances that impinged on
possessory rights of Indians in their land. Federal capacity to bring
a suit to set aside timber contracts was found in United States V.
Boyd,"" despite the fact that the land was held in fee by the Indian
grantors and that these Cherokee owners were state citizens ° In
conformity to guardian law, the suit was brought with the Indians
as parties to the government action. Continuing guardianship over
Indians, regardless of citizenship status, was affirmed and likened
to the guardian care of the government over seamen, who were also
wards of the United States. 1
The theory of trust duty was used in United States v. Flournoy,2
a Nebraska case. The court allowed the United States, in its own
right as trustee, to proceed in equity to oust the defendant real estate
company from Indian lands held in federal trust and to restrain the
company from further inducing the Indians to sign leases violating
the restriction against alienation imposed on their allotted lands.'
The defendant's contention that ejectment presented an adequate
remedy at law was dismissed on the finding that the proper per-
formance of the federal trustee's duties could not be accomplished
by a legal remedy.64 The Flournoy case was cited and a similar result
was reached in a subsequent Alaska case.65 The Alaska case blurred
the guardian-trustee distinction by finding that there was a federal
right and duty to act alone as "guardian or trustee" for the natives,
who were termed "wards of the United States of America." '66
The Supreme Court avoided the use of private guardian-trustee
law more than lower courts in deciding Indian cases. Private law
concepts are implied in Supreme Court cases or casually introduced
through the adoption of lower court language. Trust law language
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was not used in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 7 but the Court
found authority for the federal government to make tribal property
productive (as the trustee is usually required to do) once the gov-
ernment had undertaken an administrative responsibility for the
land."" The role of the government in making the land productive
was not framed as a fiduciary duty, however, since the Court pointed-
ly refused to consider whether the proposed federal action would
operate beneficially to the interests of the Cherokees."' In the same
term of the Court, Justice Harlan strongly affirmed the responsi-
bility of the federal government toward Indians while rejecting
appellee's notion that the responsibility grew out of contract." The
Court allowed the United States to maintain the action as trustee7'
holding legal title to Indian land.7 2 Dicta asserts the extraordinary
power and duty of the federal government which, while not termed
a guardian, was said to be engaged in policies to benefit and control
the Indian ward, who was in a state of dependency and entitled to
care and protection.7"
McKay v. Kalyton,74 decided by the Supreme Court in 1907,
strengthened the federal fiduciary role through legislative interpre-
tation. In 1894, Congress had designated circuit courts of the United
States as the proper forums for the commencement, prosecution, or
defense of any action or proceeding involving claims to allotted
land. 5 Under the statute, there was no provision making the United
States a necessary party to any such action.70 The McKay Court
deemed that through a later amendment 77 the United States did be-
come an indispensable party to allotment controversies, noting that
the requirement clearly demonstrated an active trustee interest by
the United States in the disposition of Indian lands.7 8
The Supreme Court was eventually led to reject private law appli-
cations in Indian cases by following the reasoning of the Eighth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, which seemed to be cognizant of guardian-
trustee distinctions79 and sympathetic to the federal government's
intention to manage Indian affairs with powers going beyond those
of the private guardian or trustee.8 0
In 191o, the Eighth Circuit, without citing authority, attempted
to clarify the confusion caused by the guardian-ward terminology
used to describe the relationship between the national government
and the Indian. Although frequently used, guardian-ward terms
were but words of illustration and not of definition, stated Judge
Amidon in United States v. Allen,8' and "... . to attempt to reason
from the private law of guardian and ward to the measures of the
federal government in dealing with the Five Civilized Tribes leads
only to confusion and a subversion of the real scheme of govern-
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ment.'' s2 By declining to confine actions of the federal government
to guardian law, the court was able to allow the United States to
bring a suit to cancel almost 4,000 Indian allottee conveyances with-
out naming the allottee-trust beneficiaries as indispensable parties.,3
There was no effort to demonstrate the federal right to sue through
the application of trust law in the case.
One of the many appeals from Allen reached the Supreme Court
in 1912.4 Having lost in the Eighth Circuit, Heckman and another
grantee of allottee conveyances appealed on the grounds that the
government lacked standing to maintain the suits it had brought.85
In affirming the Circuit Court of Appeals and allowing the United
States to maintain its actions, Justice Hughes discussed federal con-
trol over Indian land, not as evidence of trusteeship, but of guardian-
ship.80 The private law principles that trustees hold property for
beneficiaries and that trustees, not guardians, can enter court in their
own right to enforce a trust, was totally ignored. Obviously, there
was no intent to contain federal actions within private law limits
and it would be naive to attribute the Heckman result simply to
confusion and misunderstanding of the law. Rather, Heckman was
used as an opportunity to confirm that federal power over Indians
was plenary and not dependent on the acquiescence of the Indians. 7
As the Eighth Circuit had previously held, the power did not rest
upon conventional law concepts and was not circumscribed by rules
which govem private relations.8 Other appeals taken from Allen 9
adopt the Heckman rule and are turned on legislative interpretation,
with almost no mention of trustee or guardian precepts.
For the cases under discussion, the pronouncements in Heckman
ended the judicial flirtation with the application of private law to
the federal handling of Indian affairs. Private law was never really
applied in a meaningful way. Thus, when "guardian," "ward,"
"trust," and "trustee" appear in the Indian law cases decided be-
tween 1887 and 1924, no private law concept should be inferred. The
courts simply did not hold the government to the legal standards
implied by those words and the terms should be looked upon as
having minimal legal import. They were but designations applied
through mistake and confusion, or merely used for convenience to
facilitate some expression, however inaccurate, of the relationship
existing between the federal government and the Indians. The
guardianship exercised over Indians is, therefore, a power going be-
yond that of the private law guardian. It inculcates elements of
trustee power and responsibility, but is not as limited or as demand-
ing as the rights and duties of trustees. Federal guardianship rests
not on private law principles; rather, it is grounded on the ability
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of a sovereign to act in a self-serving, convenient manner provided
it can effectively maintain its assumed power to do so. As sovereign,
the United States chose to assume comprehensive power in dealing
with Indian matters. It demonstrated that it had the strength to
effectively maintain those powers and to define its guardianship in
its own terms.
Tribal Status and Indian Sovereignty
Depending on the sources consulted, the American approach to
Indian tribal status and sovereignty is termed either unique"° or as
consistent with international law and the approach of other sov-
ereign nations containing aboriginal populations."' The former
school claims that political history fails to disclose another instance
of a relation like that between the United States and American
Indians."' Those who give the American approach a traditional des-
ignation place it in the context of international law, which recog-
nizes the protective nature of the relationship between sovereign
and aborigine. 3 The dichotomy of the theorists' approach can be
reconciled if one accepts the idea that the relationship between the
United States and the aborigines conformed to tradition at the out-
set, but developed unique features as United States expansion began
to substantially affect the Indian way of life. North American colon-
ization by European nations, while touching and influencing Indian
groups, did not result in a substantial alteration of the aboriginal
civilization. The growth of the United States did. Abstract theories
about the nature and origin of the American approach to tribal
status give perspective, but they are largely academic because of the
realities of the situation. 4 Although the national character of Indian
tribes was recognized in treaties-the very making of which seems
to denote sovereign status-it is clear that from the earliest time the
tribes were but dependent nations under the protectorate of the
United States. 5 It is an oversimplification to attribute nation-state
sovereign status to the Indian tribes solely because the United States
entered into treaties with them.9 Moreover, that assumption ignores
the influence of the long historical tradition of European-North
American Indian relations. First the Continental Congress, and
then the United States government adopted the traditional approach
of England, which reflected the practices of other European nations
in their Indian relationsY Characteristic of this tradition was the
extension of "protection" over the Indian tribes.0 8 The new govern-
ment of the United States fell heir to the accepted Indian policies of
the Spanish, French, Dutch, and English-four nations which had
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol4/iss2/2
assumed a protectorate stance in relations with the North American
Indians. 9
It can be argued, of course, that Indian tribal status should not
be defined by applying the perceptions of colonial powers. It is true
that when Indian tribes lived unmolested and free of the European
influence, their independence, self-government, and power over a
land base were such that the tribes were sovereign.100 However, the
power to remain independent, the power to protect the right of self-
government, and the ability to defend the land base are required
elements of sovereign existence. As against the Europeans, the In-
dian tribes lacked the strength to manifest these essential attributes
of sovereignty. 1 1 Unless voluntarily limited, the power of a sov-
ereign nation extends as far as its power can be effectively enforced.
The European nations that claimed land in North America were
able to extend their protective power over Indian tribes because
their superior strength allowed effective enforcement of the assumed
power. When the "protectors" became involved in the internal
affairs of sovereign tribes and found they could enforce their will, a
compromise of the tribal status away from full sovereignty was ef-
fected. Tribal sovereignty was weakened and the pattern for its
eventual destruction by the United States government was set. The
definition of Indian tribal status, after the arrival of the Europeans,
became a political matter because true sovereignty no longer existed
within the Indian tribes. Tribal status and Indian sovereignty could
thus mean whatever the Europeans determined it to mean and if the
Indians were disadvantaged by the circumscribed definition of their
rights and powers, there was really very little they could do about it.
It was within this framework of established political power over
the Indians that the United States came into being as a sovereign
nation. It soon demonstrated, despite some setbacks, that it, like
its European predecessors, had the power to enforce its will against
the Indians.0 2 Once the United States had established its superior
strength, it assumed the role of definer of Indian tribal status, 13
thereby carrying on the tradition established in 2oo years of Euro-
pean dealings with the North American tribes.
By the time the General Allotment Act was passed in 1887, tribal
status had undergone over fifty years of conflicting judicial definition
and an even longer period of statutory buffeting. Initially, both the
courts and Congress had been willing to recognize the tribal unit as
a political society with substantial powers of self-government.0
Thus, while tribes were not accorded the status of independent for-
eign nations 15 with all the attributes of sovereignty, they were al-
lowed some autonomy over internal matters.0 6 The continuation of
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the tribal unit helped justify the decision to remove Indians from
state jurisdiction and made management of Indian affairs through
treaties more convenient.
A turn away from traditional recognition and bolstering of the
tribal unit was an inevitable consequence of the acquisitive land
policy of the United States and the subsequent Indian land loss. For
the United States to successfully accomplish its acquisition of land
and deal with the displaced Indians, the power of Congress over
the Indians as individuals had to be enlarged and the strength of the
tribal unit had to be diminished. The relative ease with which the
government implemented this redistribution of power validates the
theory that tribal status was entirely definable by the United States
and that the very existence of the tribal unit was at the sufference of
the American sovereign.
The allotment legislative series1'7 proved useful in serving two
interests of the United States. It furthered land policies by providing
for land cessions from Indian tribes and it soothed the federal con-
science by giving the land grab the gloss of a social engineering pro-
gram. But, allotment and its offer of citizenship to the Indians raised
enigmatic questions about the continuation of tribal existence."°8
Allotment was touted as a means of civilizing the Indians and bring-
ing them to the full responsibilities of citizenship. 00 In 1896 the
Supreme Court ruled that a treaty dissolving tribal organization was
a valid source of power for determining the political and property
rights of the Indians involved." 0 The tribal unit had traditionally
been the conduit through which federal power over Indians had been
funneled, so the Court drew the conclusion that citizenship was an
alternative to continuing in a tribal relation with the United States,"'
and thus was a move away from guardianship. Although this was a
logical conclusion to draw from the allotment philosophy, it soon
became apparent the Congress had no intention of ending its guard-
ianship or reducing its powers over Indians." 2 In re Heff" '3 there-
fore became a serious judicial misstep because of the conclusion that
allotment was evidence of the beginning of the end of federal guard-
ianship over Indians." 4 In ruling that an allottee who had gained
state and national citizenship was no longer under the federal police
power, the Court undoubtedly thought it was carrying out the aims
of Congress."15 The Court became aware of its misreading of con-
gressional purpose" 6 and spent the next ten years distinguishing and
working around the Heft ruling so as to bring decisions in line with
congressional intent.1. 7 To this end, the Supreme Court held that
citizenship did not end the jurisdiction of the United States over an
individual with a tribal affiliation."18 Neither did the holding of land
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through allotment, although coupled with citizenship, terminate the
Indians from their tribal relations, 19 although this might be affected
by the duration of the federal trust period over allotted land.1
20
The work of the Court was made easier when it finally overruled
Heif'2' after ten years of struggling with the inconsistencies it raised.
In United States v. Nice 22 the tribal status of an allottee Indian
citizen was specifically affirmed 23 and the Allotment Act was held
not to have ceased the tribal relationship. 24 These findings allowed
the Court to validate federal prosecution of a defendant who had
sold liquor to an Indian in violation of federal law.
25
The obsession with tribal status in Nice and in other cases between
Heft and Nice seems somewhat unnecessary because of concurrent
cases which firmly solidified congressional power over Indian life
and effectively destroyed any real powers of the tribes. United States
v. Kagama,2 6 handed down the year before the General Allotment
Act in :L887, set the tone for the new assumption of federal power
relative to its guardianship over Indians. In sustaining the consti-
tutionality of the Major Crimes Act, 27 the Supreme Court admitted
that this extension of federal criminal jurisdiction did not rest on
constitutional powers. 28 It was based instead on powers arising from
the guardianship duty. 29 The case demonstrated that federal power
could be substituted for that of Indian tribes in internal matters
(i.e., criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians),130 and that the
federal government could derive powers from a willingly assumed
duty.18
1
In a series of cases after 1887, the courts continued to exercise the
power to define tribal status, or to uphold the right of Congress to
do so. Often this required the imaginative finding of sources of fed-
eral power. The Cherokee cases of this period are excellent examples
of newly conceived powers and the effort to dispose of the lingering
legal question of Indian sovereignty which the Cherokees so per-
sistently raised. The incursion of the Southern Kansas Railway onto
Cherokee land brought the tribe back into court in 1890.112 Eminent
domain powers of the federal government underscored the decision
allowing the railroad to cross Indian land,' 33 but the Court took the
opportunity to reiterate the absence of Indian tribal sovereignty'34
and the continuing wardship of the Cherokees. 35
A second Cherokee case 86 avoided the tribal contention that their
land was held in fee simple with the statement, "[w]hatever title the
Indians have is in the tribe and not in individuals..., and upheld
the power of a federal agent to make administrative decisions about
management of tribal land, even if the tribe objected. 8 The power
of Congress to provide for leasing of tribal lands was said to derive
209
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from its previously assumed power to determine the membership of
the tribe"' 9-a strange deduction, but one consistent with the di-
minishing role of the tribe in handling its internal affairs. If the
tribe was stripped of the power to determine something so basic as
its own membership, its destruction as a self-governing unit was
nearly complete. Congressional power to determine tribal member-
ship clearly rested on the plenary powers of Congress. 140
Any barriers that treaty obligations imposed on the expansion of
federal power over Indians were cast aside by the significant finding
in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,'4' which broke new ground by distin-
guishing six earlier cases 142 dealing with Indian land. Here, the
controversy was over the power of the Congress to administer tribal
property, 43 although the significance of the case lies in its finding
that Congress had the power to legislate concerning tribal property,
despite conflict with earlier treaties. Congress also had the power to
abrogate treaty provisions. 44 The plenary power of Congress and its
paramount authority over Indians because of guardianship 4 al-
lowed Congress to disregard stipulations of a treaty whenever con-
venient. 41
This ruling, along with the official end of treaty-making that had
come in 1873,' 47 was indeed a shift away from the tradition of allow-
ing the Indians a degree of autonomy and of paying lip service to
the recognition of the tribes as separate entities under a federal um-
brella of protection. The changing land scene was largely responsible.
For many Indians self-sufficiency was gone,148 and the federal govern-
ment was beginning to face the reality that its policies were destroy-
ing a civilization. Assumptions of power were, in truth, regarded as
giving the government some duty to these wards, many of whom
were now literally dependent, but the duty was given a paternalistic
and superior cast. 49 The government of the United States had never
remained at arm's length from the affairs of the Indians, but its land
policies brought about conditions that would have made withdrawal
from Indian affairs unthinkable. Caretaker responsibilities for the
education, health, and welfare of individual Indians were added to
the many responsibilities already assumed. 50 In this dimension, the
guardianship of the United States took on its unique characteristic
of providing direct supervision, through a huge bureaucracy, over
almost every aspect of the individual Indian's life.
The Nature of Indian Title and Rights to Land
In-depth studies' 5' have discussed Indian land title, aboriginal use
and occupancy, the distinctive character of Indian communal prop-
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erty, the application of the doctrine of discovery, and other major
facets of Indian land law. For purposes of this paper, a brief outline
is presented to describe the evolution of events leading to the Indian
land situation on the eve of general allotment.
By applying the doctrine of discovery, the United States estab-
lished its legal title to lands used and occupied by Indians 5 2 and
denied the native inhabitants the right to alienate their lands to any
party, save the federal government. 53 Although Indian title was not
one of fee simple,'" Indian possession was to be respected by state
governments,1 5 private citizens, 5 and, technically, the federal gov-
ernment,'5 7 in that Indian land was not to be taken without consent
and compensation. 58 The cession of lands through treaty became
the established method for gaining Indian lands and extinguishing
Indian title.5 9 Cession and removal worked to disengage the Indians
from land wanted for white settlement and still give the Indians
large tracts upon which to settle, as long as western land remained
plentiful.
The increasing scarcity of desirable land after the Civil War
caused land-hungry settlers to look to the lands that had previously
been reserved to the Indians in the removal treaties. Allotment, over-
hauled from its original form'60 and given a new social signifi-
cance,'5 ' provided a means to acquire parts of formerly reserved land.
Generally, allotment acts required members of the tribes to select
individual tracts of land and then for the tribe to cede "surplus"
land back to the United States for sale to white settlers. 2 Previous
agreements or treaties that guaranteed to Indians certain land hold-
ings' 03 or that set conditions under which cessions could occur,'
proved to be no obstacle to the ultimate power of Congress to regain
Indian land.
This brief summary of events prior to 1887 is not intended to
imply that a simple, consistent Indian land policy existed in the
United States. The only consistency was in the federal government's
assertion of a paramount and unrestrained power over the handling
and disposition of Indian land. In acquiring land, the government
could impose small barriers for itself, as it did in recognizing occu-
pancy rights, but the facts demonstrate that no constitutional
limit,0 5 treaty guarantee, 16 or rule of real property67 could stand
between Indian land and the power of the federal government to
acquire it, if desired. Neither were there limits to the power of the
government to control the land held by the Indians. Who among
the tribes would get land, 68 how it would be managed,'0 9 and how
or whether it could be alienated 70 were controls found to be within
the guardian and plenary powers of the United States. Indian title
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and the Indian right to land was, as other Indian matters, totally at
the discretion of the federal government to define and interpret.
Between 1887 and 1924, Indian land issues dominated the federal
Indian policy. The cases reveal the problems encountered by the
government in its assumption of an omnipotent guardian role in the
distribution and management of Indian land and the tragic inability
of the Indian to assert any right adequate to preserve his original
holding or control the land assigned to him. State versus federal
powers, and the problems rising out of restrictions on alienation, the
management of Indian land, and the wedding of allotment and
citizenship are addressed in the decisions.
By invoking the supremacy clause, the federal government suc-
cessfully managed to exclude state governments from most Indian
matters. After the General Allotment Act, new conflicts arose from
states' efforts to tax allotted land. The resulting litigation analyzed
the interest in land acquired by an allottee.
United States v. Rickert' was decided on guardianship principles
and demonstrated that, although the Indian had been declared a
citizen, he was still being "prepared for assuming the habits of
civilized life, and ultimately the privileges of citizenship.' ' 12 During
the period of preparation, he did not hold allotted land in fee and
was not subject to South Dakota taxes. According to Rickert, federal
restrictions kept the legal title in the United States and allottees
occupied land only with its consent and authority. 7 8 The allottee
had no right to enter contracts or make conveyances affecting his
land. 7 4 The only allottee right was to occupy and cultivate the
land. 75 Federal protection against state taxation also extended to
improvements and personal property on an allotment because such
property had to be safeguarded if the federal wards were to be edu-
cated to adopt the habits of civilized life. The improvements and
chattels were, in fact, the property of the United States.17
0
Choate v. Trapp 77 denied the state's right to tax, despite federal
legislation that would have allowed it. This Oklahoma case came to
the Supreme Court for interpretation of legislation allotting land
of the Five Civilized Tribes. Legal title to the land in question had
been held by the tribes for common use of tribal members 78 prior
to the decision to allot the land 17 in preparation for Oklahoma
statehood. Within the special allotment legislation, brief periods of
nontaxability and nonalienability were set,8 0 and citizenship of
tribal members was provided for. The Court stated that it was
"... fair to assume that ... much of the land was alienable and all
of it was non-taxable when . . . Oklahoma was admitted to the
Union."':' After statehood, Congress passed an act removing re-
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strictions from alienation that might have remained on some land
and subjecting that land to taxation. 82 The Indians who had
brought suit in Choate to enjoin state taxation were found to hold
land to which this legislation applied. A constitutional issue-rare
in these cases-was framed by the Court: Had the plaintiffs acquired
rights under the original legislation, which excepted their land from
taxation, that were vested property rights and thus protected by the
fifth amendment?'1 Plaintiffs' interest in the land was delineated in
answer to the question. The individual Indian was said to have had
an equitable interest in property to which his tribe once held legal
title. The interest gained by the individual in an allotment plot was
determined to be consideration sufficient to satisfy and extinguish
the former equitable interest.184 Because of the original terms of the
allotment legislation, to accept land in severalty was to accept a
piece of nontaxable land.8 5 This tax protection, the Court con-
cluded, was a property right that vested in the Indian accepting an
allotment and relinquishing his claim to title in common. 8 6 The
tax exemption was attached to the land and it became constitution-
ally protected property. Congress could not impair a vested private
right by legislation allowing the land to be taxed, despite the plenary
guardianship that existed over the political and personal status of
the Indian allottee.8 7
State interference was also discouraged by McKay v. Kalyton.'88
The Oregon Supreme Court had found that the United States was
not a necessary party when the question of possession of allotted
land was at issue, and upon appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the
United States Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. 89
The federal right to intervene in allotment controversies and federal
jurisdiction were both upheld in McKay and in state courts were
denied jurisdiction in allotment cases, even though the allottees were
state citizens. 190 Rickert was quoted to describe the Indian interest
in land.' 9' Because the United States held legal title to allotted
land, and in furtherance of acts of Congress, 9 3 only federal courts
could hear disputes over allotments.
A state could have jurisdiction over former Indian-occupied land
if it derived a title from the federal government. In Beecher v.
Wetherby, 94 two parties claimed land that had been recognized
as belonging to the Menominee Tribe 95 which ceded the land to the
United States. One party claimed under a United States patent and
the other under a state patent. The state patent was validated be-
cause the land was in a Section .6 township which, under the Wis-
consin Enabling Act, had been reserved by the federal government
for the state.'96 The land in Section 16 thus had never become public
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land to be distributed by the federal government to settlers. Indian
title and land rights received much attention in the Beecher case.
Before ceding their land, the Indians were said to have had a right
of occupancy that could be interfered with only by the federal gov-
ernment.197 While considerations of "justice as would control a
Christian people"'98 were presumed, the right of the United States
to dispose of legal title to Indian-occupied lands was unques-
tioned. 9"
This result seemed to diminish the land rights that occupancy
previously was held to bestow on the Indian. Just two years before
Beecher, the Court had made one of its strongest statements on the
sacred nature of those rights in the Leavenworth Railroad case.
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Indian occupancy was said to give Indians an unquestioned right to
occupy land-a right that could only be extinguished by a voluntary
cession. 10' The occupancy right was as sacred as the right of the
United States to the fee and the government had an obligation to
enforce it.202 For all practical purposes, the Court stated, the Indians
owned the land, and if they so chose, they might hold it forever. 0 a
The impact of this language is tempered by consideration of the
critical factual difference between the Beecher and Leavenworth
cases. In Beecher, a treaty of cession had been signed by the Indians.
In Leavenworth, Indian land was being appropriated for a railroad
right-of-way with no formal cession having occurred. The Leaven-
worth Court indignantly refused to "presume that an act so injurious
to the Indians [as appropriating their land before a formal cession
had occurred] was intended" 204 by Congress because such a taking
would be "wrong. '20 5 At the same time, the Court cast a cynical eye
on the voluntariness of formal cessions with its comment that "con-
straint, in theory at least" had not been placed on the Indians to
cede occupied land.206 Indian occupancy rights were to be protected,
but only until the admittedly sham ritual of a cession treaty was con-
cluded. Judicial justification for terminating the Indian right of
occupancy reeked of social Darwinism: a "higher civilization" was
replacing the "semi-barbarous" tribes.20 7
In United States v. Boyd, °8 Cherokee Indians who had remained
in North Carolina rather than remove west with their tribe, were
found to be citizens of the state, but not of the United States.0
They were, however, under United States guardianship and this gave
the federal government power to join with individual Indians in a
suit to cancel a timber contract made by tribal leaders on land
owned without alienation restrictions and in fee simple by the
tribe.210 Guardianship also brought the case under federal court
jurisdiction. As state citizens, the Eastern Cherokees were subject
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to North Carolina's taxes and criminal laws, and their land was held
under state sovereignty and tenure. 11 Yet, in adjudicating an In-
dian's interest in the land, the state courts were without jurisdic-
tion.212 The land was burdened with a condition 13 that required
review of conveyances allegedly imposed to protect the Indians from
fraud.214
The Indian's interest in his allotted land was greatly compromised
by restrictions on alienation that were imposed in allotment legisla-
tion. 18 Controversies relating to alienation of allotted land were
muddled by the unfortunate legislative drafting that called for a
"patent" to issue to the Indian upon allotment. 2 ' Patents com-
monly confer fee simple title to public land,21 7 but the first allotment
patent conveyed no fee. In the cases involving allotted land, the
courts were kept busy explaining when a patent was not really a
patent.
In deciding United States v. Rickert, the Court said that the first
patents which were issued at the time of allotment were but mem-
oranda in writing, designed to show that the United States held legal
title to the allotted land for a twenty-five year trust period.218 At the
end of the trust period (which the President could extend),219 the
title in fee would be conveyed to the Indian, presumably by a "regu-
lar patent." 220 According to the General Allotment Act, any convey-
ance or contract touching the land during the trust period would be
deemed absolutely null and void.221 A better distinction between the
first and second patent was made in Monson v. Simonson. ss The
first instrument issued to the allottee was inaccurately termed a
patent, the Court explained, because it was in reality an allotment
certificate.223 Under the certificate, the allottee held a very limited
property interest. The purpose of the severe restrictions was to safe-
guard the Indians "against their own improvidence"22 4 while over-
seeing their evolution from a state of "dependent wardship to one of
full emancipation. 225
Cases in which alienation or encumbrances on the land were made
prior to the issuance of a fee patent were frequently adjudicated after
1887. They usually involved the efforts of whites to acquire Indian
land by purchase or lease. Ironically, the Indian owners were shunted
aside in most of the litigation over their allotted land. The federal
government entered court in the name of protecting its own interests
and the rights that flowed from its guardian status; opportunistic
parties argued the case for Indian land rights so they themselves
could acquire the land. To this end, parties defending conveyances
made during the trust period argued that citizenship gave Indians
the right to lease allotted land. It was urged in Beck v. Flournoy=
20
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that citizenship could not be conferred without giving Indians the
unrestricted power to use, sell, and control all property in which they
had an interest.227 This was not so, the Eighth Circuit determined,
because in its sovereign power the United States could hold title to
land in trust, especially for a ". . dependent race like the Indians,
who [had] always been regarded as wards of the government.
228
The dignity or value of citizenship, the court maintained, was not
lessened by holding an estate in land that was inalienable.
22
Allotment land restrictions were normally imposed by statute, but
in Wiggan v. Conolly2 0 it was held that treaties could also place
valid restrictions on alienation of land belonging to a minor allottee,
even if the restriction did not take effect until after a final fee patent
had been issued.231 The restriction on alienation was found to run
with the land in Bowling v. United States, 232 so that heirs of an
allottee were bound by the restriction and could not convey the land
without special legislation. 233 Where the nature of an allottee's in-
terest in land was unclear because of conflicting legislative and
treaty language, and the allottee executed a warranty deed to convey
the land, the Court stated that language should be construed to
benefit the Indian2 34 trying to disclaim the conveyance. In Starr v.
Long Jim,23 5 the Court decided that the Indian would not be bene-
fited by the construction that his title to land was a fee simple.230
The warranty deed did not operate to estop the allottee from deny-
ing the grantee's title23 7 because it would have been against public
policy to deprive the Indian of his land.2 8
Two cases studied are distinguishable from the general nonalien-
ability line of decisions that dominated during the years after gen-
eral allotment. In one case, Jones v. Meecham, 239 an Indian was
found to hold a fee simple title. The fee simple was passed to Chief
Moose Dung by an unrestricted special reservation in a Chippewa
treaty of cession.240 By the treaty, Chippewa land was to be distrib-
uted in severalty 4' with tribal leaders receiving special reservations
of land.242 Moose Dung's title was not one of mere occupancy, be-
cause the treaty converted his right to the sections of land reserved
to him into an alienable property title.2 43 The second case relied on
interpretation of congressional intent to determine that an allottee
Indian of mixed blood on the White Earth Reservation in Minne-
sota was excepted from legislation restricting alienation of allotted
land.2 4 The federal control over this class of Indians could not be
tied to land, the Court concluded, although in other respects they
might be wards of the government.245
Determination of the land interest held by the Cherokees pre-
sented unique questions because grants of land to the tribe after the
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eastern removal had been made in fee simple. However, the fee
simple title was held to be of "no consequence" in the federal taking
of Cherokee land for a railroad right-of-way.246 Since the fee patent
was issued to the Cherokees for land to be held in common, no title
was vested in severalty to members of the tribe.2 47 Neither did land
interest granted the Cherokees by treaties conveying title, possession,
and jurisdiction 24 8 insulate the tribe from federal control. The
treaties evidenced no ". . . intention upon the part of the Govern-
ment, to discharge them from their condition of pupilage or de-
pendency ... .-"249 To further the discharge of its guardian duties, the
federal government had the power to review the manner in which
the tribe executed its responsibilities as the holder of the land fee in
trust for tribal members.2r If the federal government was dissatis-
fied with tribal administration, it could intervene to protect in-
dividual members of the tribe in their personal and property
rights. 201 This included the right to lease tribal land for the benefit
of the collective members of the tribe and neither individuals nor
the tribe itself held property interests which would preclude this
action.0
The question of what rights accrued to a member of the Five
Civilized Tribes upon addition to the tribal rolls and declaration of
eligibility for an allotment received contradictory answers. Accord-
ing to one case,20 3 no vested right was passed to a Choctaw or Chicka-
saw Indian when it was determined by a congressional commission
that he was a tribal member and potential allottee 54 The commis-
sion was but a creature of Congress. Although called a Territorial
Court,2 5 it lacked judicial powers and its rulings vested no right.20
In fact, Congress could inquire further and change any of the com-
mission's findings as to tribal membership. 7 A Chickasaw, on the
other hand, was said to have acquired "valuable rights" upon the
addition of his name to the tribal rolls and his certification for allot-
ment.0
Pueblo and Alaska native rights to land would appear to present a
special case because international treaties, rather than the doctrine
of discovery, brought these groups under United States jurisdiction.
The potential difficulties caused courts, bent on extending federal
guardian control over all Indians, little trouble. United States v.
Sandoval 9 applied liquor control laws to the New Mexico Pueblos.
Their title to land was compared to that of the Five Civilized Tribes
in that, while a fee simple, it was a communal title.260 Federal
guardian care of the Five Civilized Tribes had not been precluded
because of their land interest, therefore adequate precedentl to
support federal control over the Pueblos existed. Whether their land
217
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was within the original territory of the United States or in territory
subsequently acquired was irrelevant. 2 Native Alaskans were found
by territorial courts to have a right of occupancy in which they
should not be disturbed until Congress legislated as to the means by
which title to occupied land could be acquired. 0 No right of aliena-
tion existed with the natives, and Congress could exert guardianship
over their land interests.
2 64
In reviewing these cases, it can be seen that the right of occu-
pancy, which had been reserved to the Indian from the earliest days,
proved to be meaningless. Once the land was needed for a purpose
conflicting with undisturbed occupancy, only a formal extinguish-
ment ritual was necessary to acquire the land. Allotment gave no real
interest to the Indian initially and even worked to deny him an
interest in his personal property. The grant of citizenship which
accompanied allotment was a mockery because it imparted no con-
stitutional rights which courts consistently respected as a matter of
law, equity, or fairness. Undeniably, the Indian right and interest in
land was greatly diminished by the cases decided after 1887. Federal
guardianship, buttressed by the plenary power of Congress, was the
powerful tool used to accomplish that dimunition.
Judicial Definition and Justification of Federal Guardianship
Prior to the passage of the General Allotment Act in 1887, the
courts had indicated that federal guardianship over Indians was a
temporary arrangement, leading to full citizenship status after an
appropriate "training" period. The Indian was said to be dependent
and in a state of pupilage as he advanced from his "savage" condi-
tion. 05 Various legislative measures for the Indian were directed at
aiding the native in becoming self-supporting and in "acquiring the
arts of civilized life,1200 and this was seen as a movement to render the
Indian fit for citizenship.267 Many perceived the allotment of Indian
land in severalty as the final step in the civilization process and thus
the linking of allotment and citizenship very appropriate.200 The
major provisions of the General Allotment Act 26 were to grant In-
dian heads of families and single persons specified acreages, to place
the lands under a federal trust to restrict alienation, and to grant
citizenship to all allottees who abandoned their tribes and adopted
civilized habits.
The language of the cases after 1887 reveal the minimal effect of
allotment and citizenship on the judicial characterization and appli-
cation of guardianship. Although theoretically diminishing it, the
federal guardianship was upheld and actually expanded and strength-
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ened by the court decisions between 1887 and 1924. Characteriza-
tions of guardianship continued the pre-1887 pattern that expressed
a federal duty to the Indian, although the origin of the duty was not
agreed upon. Language from United States v. Kagama,270 decided
the year before the General Allotment Act was passed, survived the
grant of citizenship. The Kagama language, directly quoted in full or
part, in cases spanning the years 189o through 19z3,271 termed the
power of the government over the remnants of the once powerful
Indian race as necessary for Indian protection because they had be-
come a weak and diminished people.27 2 The Indians were owed a
duty because their condition came about largely through the course
of dealings of the federal government with them.273 Even when the
Kagama language was not used, the duty to protect was often tied
to the dependence of the IndianY 4 Obligations growing from treaty
agreements were said to impose on the United States a duty to pro-
tect,2 70 as did the fee ownership of Indian land,276 even in situations
where alienation was not restricted and no trust arrangement
existed.2
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The federal assumption of duty was also required because of the
"ignorant" and injudicious nature of the Indian,278 and his need to
be shielded from the cunning of white persons seeking to take his
property or harm him,279 or in the reverse, because of the need to
protect whites from unfriendly Indians.80 Proof or evidence of
guardianship was said to lie in the government's protection of In-
dians from the evils of alcohol28' (a protection justly due a weak
people from a strong nation,8 2 according to one case) and in the
restrictions on alienation which secured the Indian in his property
8 3
Only a few cases stated that the Indians had always been wards of
the nation,284 but several dealt with the question of when wardship
would end and how the Indian would be emancipated from his state
of dependency, tutelege, or pupilage. This was a political question,
the courts agreed, and one sometimes in the hands of the execu-
tive,20 but more frequently left to Congress.
2 6
Contrary to the expectations of the "civilization" proponents,
then, citizenship and allotment did not mean an end to guardianship.
Numerous cases287 made it very clear that the Indian continued to
be a ward of the federal government, despite the enactment of the
General Allotment Act. It became quite apparent that the courts
were more than willing to act in concert with popular opinion, as
reflected in legislative enactments, to further reduce the sphere with-
in which Indians could make their own choices about how to con-
duct their lives. Dramatic changes of judicial position were required
to uphold guardianship during the period studied. Several examples
2-19.
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illustrate the willingness of the courts to abandon justifications they
had previously set up as apparent conditions precedent to the exer-
cise of federal guardianship. When essential elements of the condi-
tions were not in evidence, the courts chose not to free the Indian
from his wardship, but rather to simply give it a new justification.
In all cases studied except three, one of which was later overruled,
guardianship was upheld. A reading of all the cases calls into ques-
tion the validity of every propounded legal foundation set forth to
support the assumption of guardianship by the federal government
during the post-allotment period.
Tribal Status. A first example of the fluid position of the courts
is found in cases dealing with tribal status, or the political position
of Indians. Judicial bouts with the problems of defining tribal status
and Indian sovereignty have already been explored in this paper. The
discussion showed how allotment was initially interpreted as being
a solvent of the tribal organization, with citizenship becoming the
alternative to an Indian's tribal affiliation. Although reasonable, this
interpretation had to be reconsidered and eventually abandoned be-
cause it did not conform to congressional intent or revisionary legis-
lation. The courts were understandably confused. The federal gov-
ernment had generally dealt with tribal units, rather than individual
Indians,288 and in court decisions there was a traditional linking of
guardian-wardship to the tribal relation.280 The possible disappear-
ance of tribal organizations presented the courts with a situation they
did not know how to handle. At first blush, citizenship, as conferred
by the General Allotment Act, seemed to legislate an end to tribal
organizations. Did this mean that Congress no longer intended to
deal with Indians in their tribal relation, and a fortiori, to end its
guardianship? As previously discussed, the Supreme Court did reach
this conclusion in In re Heft, 20° only to reverse itself later.291 Another
interpretation would allow the termination of tribal relations to
remove the organizational insulation of the tribe and free the federal
government to extend guardianship directly to the individual In-
dian.202 A third way of handling the complexity of the tribal status
issue was to ignore it.208 The cases between 1887 and 1924 are illus-
trative of all these approaches. Obviously, a tribal relation was not,
then, an absolute condition to guardianship. Guardianship would
be upheld, with or without that factor.
Two Court of Claims cases have contradictory language on the
exercise of guardianship over Indians considered to be in a tribal
relation. In 1887,204 the court said that the individual tribal members
were not the wards of the government, but that the Chickasaw Na-
tion was the ward.295 Six years later, in the second case, the court
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characterized the issue in a claim as being between the federal gov-
ernment and individual tribal members who were the wards of the
nation29 6 In an unrelated Supreme Court case, Cherokee Nation V.
Hitchcock,9 7 sympathy for the concept of guarding the individual
was shown. The tribal unit was recognized, but it was bypassed to
allow the federal guardian to administer tribal property for the pro-
tection of the tribal members in their individual personal and prop-
erty rights.298
In reaching the ill-fated He i299 result, the Court had essentially
accepted, then modified, the argument of government attorneys who
related guardianship to the individual Indian as well as to the tribe300
and maintained that the power of guardianship was not dependent
on the tribal relationship.2 0' The Court agreed that individuals may
have become subject to the direct legislation of Congress after treaty-
making had ended in 1871,02 but that since then, citizenship had
intervened to emancipate the Indian from federal guardianship.
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Before Heft was overruled, the Court decided United States v.
Celestine,30 4 in which it vented some of its frustration over the awk-
ward position in which its perfectly reasonable decision in Heft had
placed it. Perhaps, the Court observed, Congress had been hasty in
granting citizenship to the Indian.30° In any event, the Court would
take no future position as to how or when guardianship would end,
but it would "wisely insist" that any legislation on the subject make
clear the intent of Congress.306 In moving away from Heff and back
to the position that guardianship continued, the Court half-hearted-
ly tried to reconstruct the tribal relationship that it had earlier held
to be a condition precedent to guardianship. The effects of citizen-
ship and allotment had to be minimized to accomplish this, so it was
held in Celestine that citizenship did not revoke the reservation or
emancipate the Indian from all control.307 The reservation continued
under the supervision of the federal government, even though the
land was allotted,308 and federal jurisdiction extended to an indi-
vidual allottee on the reservation, even though a citizen.30 9
Heff was completely undone by the curious ruling that citizenship
was not incompatible with a tribal existence.3 10 A few years later the
Court found that in applying guardianship, a tribal existence really
did not matter anyway because the political status of an Indian-
tribal membership, state or national citizenship-did not condition
or restrict the power of the federal government.3 11 Guardianship
could be applied directly to individual Indians.3 12 Therefore, tribal
status or the existence of a tribal relation were irrelevant.
Property Affiliation. Guardianship was justified in some cases as a
by-product of sovereign land ownership, or alternatively, the arrange-
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ment by which the federal government held Indian land in trust.
Where no property or trust vehicle existed, however, the courts were
not deterred from extending the guardian powers. Thus, the property
or land relationship between the federal government and the Indian
is a second example of the pseudo-conditions said to underpin guard-
ianship, but found to be unnecessary upon further analysis.
The previously presented review of the nature of Indian title and
rights to land explained how the United States asserted a paramount
authority over the legal title to all Indian land, leaving only a right
of occupancy with the native holders. It also described the unre-
lenting pressures which flailed away at the occupancy protections
and ultimately allowed federal fee ownership to justify the massive
Indian land cessions that accompanied removal and then allotment.
Federal control of the land has been specifically cited as a source of
power over Indians,8 18 and in one exceptional case,814 the effect of
which was later reversed, 15 the government was not allowed to act
as guardian for the Pueblo Indians because it did not hold fee title to
their land.3 16 References to exercising power over Indians because of
their residence within the geographical limits of the United States
appeared in Kagama317 and even earlier in United States v. Rogers.18
The power of Congress was considered well settled by the time
Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. 10 was decided in i.89o, but
a later case"20 showed how the Court tied control of tribal lands to
guardianship:
... [A]s regards tribal property subject to the control of the United
States as guardian of the Indians, Congress may make such
changes in management and disposition as it deems necessary to
promote their welfare. The United States is now exercising, under
the claim that the property is tribal, the powers of guardian of a
trustee in possession.82'
Four cases demonstrate that guardianship was not dependent on
the land connection as expressed in the above cases. In Heckman v.
United States,2 2 the "peculiar" relationship between Indians and
the federal government was said to create a protectable national in-
terest encompassing more than mere property considerations.
2
1
United States v. Sandova 2 4 clumsily distinguished an earlier ruling
on Pueblo guardianship and redefined Pueblos as dependent people.
They were, therefore, wards entitled to the fostering care and pro-
tection of the federal government,8 25 even though the United States
did not hold legal title to their land. 26 Guardianship turned on con-
siderations other than Pueblo status under Spanish and Mexican
rule,327 and Pueblo title to land was said not to affect the guardian
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powers of the United States.3 2 Federal control over Indians was
also said to reach far beyond property consideration in United States
v. Nice. 20 In Nice, the education and civilization duties of the gov-
ernment were seen as extra responsibilities of the guardian that were
in no way dependent on land control. Any remaining doubt that
guardianship was conditioned by land ownership or trust duties was
finally extinguished by United States v. Waller.33 1 In Waller, the
Court clearly acknowledged that guardianship could exist without
land control: ".... in whatever other respects the Government holds
these Indians as wards, they are not controlled by lands." '31
Civilization. Guardianship was most frequently justified as a
necessary protection to bring Indians into a civilized state and pre-
pare them for citizenship. This justification for the exercise of fed-
eral authority over all phases of Indian life was accepted by nine-
teenth-century writers3 32 and appeared consistently in judicial lan-
guage. 3 Civilizing the Indian required a period of pupilage," 4 but
the Indian was said to be emerging from guardianship 3 5 so that
emancipation could ultimately occur.3 6 Civilization seemed to
mean, above all, restraint from warmaking and the adoption of a
settled agrarian life.33 7 This, too, proved to be a contrived condition
to guardianship, for guardianship powers were extended over Indians
even when they met the presumed criteria for being civilized. A
good example is in Cramer v. United States,33 8 where the Court
plainly stated that the nomadic life had been abandoned by a group
of Indians who had settled in one area and farmed and improved the
land for over fifty years.339 Despite this evidence of "civilization," as
the term had been defined by the Court itself, the Indians were said
to be wards and still unemancipated from federal control and guard-
ianship.340 The Pueblo cases previously discussed present the most
dramatic example of the civilization justification for guardianship.
The Court's absolute determination to extend guardianship is per-
haps nowhere better illustrated than by comparing the Joseph and
Sandovai decisions. In the 1876 Joseph case, the Pueblos were ex-
empted from guardian care by the Supreme Court because they were
found to have maintained a civilized culture for centuries-living in
fixed communities, governing themselves, and leading a pastoral and
agrarian life of peace.3 41 The Court even questioned if they should
be termed Indians, because they had nothing in common with the
nomadic tribes who so "obviously" required guardian care.34 Thirty
years later the Supreme Court adopted a totally contrary view of
the Pueblos in order to justify calling them wards and placing them
under guardianship for purposes of controlling liquor traffic.3 43 The
pastoral Pueblos were indeed a tribe like all other Indians, according
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to the second case, and they had conveniently become "wild In-
dians" requiring federal supervision because of their primitive cus-
toms and limited civilization.3
44
Citizenship. Attaining citizenship proved no more a safeguard to
escaping federal guardian control than did meeting the criteria of a
"civilized" life. Although guardianship had long been justified as a
training period for citizenship, it was determined in case after case 4 '
that citizenship and guardianship were not incompatible. The Ninth
Circuit articulated what seemed to be the prevailing attitude about
Indian citizenship when it cautioned that "fanciful qualities" should
not be attributed to the Indian, merely because of a legislative enact-
ment.346 Citizenship neither revoked the reservation nor emanci-
pated the Indian from control.34 7 In Mullin,38 the treaty obligations
of the United States were said to continue after citizenship, and this
allowed federal protection over the Indian to abide.,4, Although
citizens, the Indians remained minors in the eyes of the law"' and
subject to liquor laws that were designed to protect Indian wards,
whether citizens or not.
Plainly, the period of pupilage and dependence to prepare the In-
dian for the privileges of citizenship would continue, even though
the citizenship grant had been made.3"' Over twenty-five years of
additional preparation to assume the full status of citizens had
elapsed by 1914 when Bowling v. United States"'z was decided. Was
the Indian any closer to the goal of emancipation? The defendant
grantees of allotted land thought so, and argued that guardianship
had surely ceased because of the citizenship bestowed a quarter of a
century earlier. Bowling was negative on emancipation and the opin-
ion echoed the familiar words: citizenship did not end guardian-
ship;33 governmental rights arose from the federal duty to a de-
pendent people; the federal authority could not be impaired." 4 Two
years later the result was the same. Guardianship continued in
1916 3" and it continued in 1923,"" the year before the passage of
the general grant of citizenship to all Indians. Clearly the citizenship
which had accompanied general allotment in 1887 did little for the
personal or political freedom of the Indian. It is equally clear that
citizenship was not the key to freedom from guardianship.
Ownership of Allotted Land. Lastly, the application of guardian-
ship was not conditioned by ownership of land in severalty. This was
shown to be true, despite the language of the General Allotment
Act, which provided that all rights, privileges, and immunities of
United States citizenship were to accompany allotment.8 7 Freedom
from guardianship would seem to follow, and this was anticipated
by the winning side in the congressional debates on general allot-
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ment. Legislators declared that the allotment system would at last
enable the Indian to acquire civilization35 because with severalty
ownership the Indian would have access to the elements upon which
civilization was thought to rest-family, home, and propertyY5 9 The
illusory nature of individual land ownership as a step away from
guardianship was exposed by the more than 25 cases between 1887
and 1924 in which allotment in severalty was held not to end guard-
ianship.80 It would be more accurate to say that federal intervention
into the individual Indian's life was actually increased after allot-
ment because the trust relationship became personalized.
In applying guardianship between 1887 and 1924, the courts con-
structed justifications and apparent conditions grounded on Indian
tribal status, federal land ownership, the civilization process, citizen-
ship, and ownership of land in severalty. Elements of one or more of
these justifications surfaced in nearly all the opinions studied, but
no court found them to be absolute, enforceable limits on the fed-
eral power of guardianship. The courts failed to consistently adhere
to any justification, so none proved to be an ultimate limit to the
federal authority, even though judicial language implied that each
new justification was establishing a power parameter. The justifica-
tions were but ad hoc legal responses. In actuality, there simply was
no judicially imposed condition or limit to the guardian powers. The
judiciary yielded to the reality that Congress would not be limited in
its handling of Indian matters and accepted the totality of Congress'
unfettered plenary power to control Indians as wards under federal
guardianship.
Power Politics, Race, and Guardianship
The true basis of guardianship, as revealed by the cases between
1887 and 1924, was nothing more than raw power applied to a sub-
jugated people who were considered to be racially inferior. By pro-
ceeding through the cases, denominators that seem to underlie
guardianship are seen eventually to cancel each other out and only
power and race remain as constants in the judicial outpouring on
the subject.
The federal power over the Indian was plenary: full, entire, com-
plete, unabridged; of that, the cases leave no doubt.361 There was a
paramount0 2 and supreme 3 authority assumed over the Indian.
The power to invoke such authority assumed obligation and duty of
a strong and superior government to guard over a weak and depleted
race.30' Gradually, like the slow turning of a key in a lock, the deci-
sions twisted obligations into rights and rights into powers 5 ---pow-
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ers that locked the Indian into the pervasive grip of the plenary au-
thority of Congress.
The racial element is not misted in subtlety, but is strongly evident
in the cases studied. Racism had pervaded Indian-white relations
from the days of the Europeans' arrogant assumptions of superi-
ority;366 it can be identified in colonial American white attitudes, 07
and it continued forward to the period of assimilation experiments
and allotment. Racial prejudice provided psychological comfort to
the dispossessors of the Indians, and by having little appreciation for
the value of native culture, they could feel justified in replacing a
primitive race with a Christian society. 6 8 Exploitation of the In-
dians to gain their land was not only permissible under this
philosophy, but actually encouraged.369 Dicta in Beecher v. Weather-
by 370 epitomized the philosophy and showed how it could work to
lessen the judicial inclination to protect Indian occupancy rights.
The Beecher Court tacitly approved actions by the government done
in anticipation of "civilized" white expansion, although the extin-
guishment of the once protected Indian title was an inevitable con-
sequence of the action.
3 71
Assimilation itself can be described as racist, in that it presupposes
the abandonment of an inferior native lifestyle and its replacement
with one echoing the dominant culture.37 2 The generalization and
stereotyping that are hallmarks of racial prejudice served especially
well to fix the image in the public mind of the Indian as an un-
civilized, heathen nomad. The inference ignored the many tribes
who were settled into sophisticated political societies and dependent
on farming or herding for a livelihood, but it made white land acquisi-
tion more excusable,37 3 gave allotment an ostensible social purpose,
and justified federal assumptions of power over people believed to
be in need of civilizing influences. In the cases studied, the Indian
need of training for a civilized life at the hands of the "superior"
white guardians clearly comes across in references to the non-Chris-
tian Indian culture,374 the lack of traditional schooling,70 the in-
feriority of communal life,376 the need to prohibit liquor consump-
tion,377 and in generalizations about the lack of industry and
judiciousness 37 8 displayed by Indians-character traits that required
efforts by the federal government to protect the Indian from him-
self.
9
Source material for court language on these subjects sometimes
came from official agent or committee reports on the Indian con-
dition. Because many Indian agents were appointed from missionary
groups,8s0 the strong bias of the Christian ethic is revealed in the
comments that influenced the courts. The retraining chore under-
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taken by an agent was directed at preparing his charges for citizen-
ship, yet there was little willingness to extend the constitutional
protections of religious liberty to Indians. Native religious customs
were obviously misunderstood and mistrusted. One report, later in-
corporated into a Supreme Court decision, 381 dismissed a dance
ritual as "little less than a ribald system of debauchery."3' 8 2 The time
had come, the agent concluded, when Indians had to give up pagan
customs and become citizens in fact.813 Apparently, citizenship and
traditional customs were seen as being mutually exclusive. Well-
meaning bigots, like the agent who wrote that report, were the great-
est source of information for congressmen and judges who were
called upon to make decisions about the lives of Indians-people
they neither knew nor understood. These on-the-scene reporters
could easily mold the thinking of decision-makers who were already
disposed to consider the Indian as savage and uncivilized because of
the white tradition of pervasive racism and the stereotyped literary
image of the Indian in the nineteenth century.
The undisguised contempt for the native culture was unrelieved by
an open-minded assessment in any of the principal cases studied.
Rather, the Indians were described as semi-barbarous,38 4 savage,3 5
primitive,38 degraded,387 and ignorant.38 The relationship between
the federal government and the Indian was frequently termed as one
between a superior and an inferior. 89 The white race was called more
intelligent and highly developed.1 0 There was no question but that
a higher civilization was thought to be justly replacing that of a
passing race whose time was over and whose existence could no
longer be justified. The very weakness of the Indians in resisting the
tide seemed to be one of their greatest moral shortcomings, but not
as serious as the Indian communal tradition. To the white observer,
the lack of proprietary interest generally displayed by tribal members
was repulsive and backward. 91 Removing the "herd" instinct was
deemed by some to be the key to civilizing the Indian. 92 This
prejudice against communal holding assisted the Supreme Court in
dismissing the value of Indian title and reaching the results in Chero-
kee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry. 9 s and United States v. San-
doval,394 both significant guardianship cases. More importantly, it
underscored the whole allotment philosophy and was instrumental
in terminating the semi-independent existence of the Five Civilized
Tribes in Indian Territory, later Oklahoma.
Many of the post-1887 cases deal with the land wrangles of the
Five Civilized Tribes. In designing legislation for allotment of the
Indian Territory, Congress relied heavily on the prejudicial Dawes
Report.9 5 Courts later turned to the Dawes language as well. The
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Dawes Commission had been appointed to enter into negotiations
with the Five Civilized Tribes to extinguish tribal title to their land
and to report on the conditions in the Indian Territory."'0 The Re-
port condemned the existing tribal governments,9 7 found the Indian
system non-American, 39 and called for its total replacement by a
massive federal intervention. 99 The uncritical acceptance of the Re-
port by the Supreme Court in Stephens v. Cherokee Nation400 again
demonstrates the influence of the writings of first-band observers of
the Indian scene. It illustrates the prevailing presumption that the
Indian way was the wrong and inferior way and unacceptable to
white America. Guardianship fed on these superior attitudes. The
cases relating to the Five Civilized Tribes showed that no limits
would be placed on the government's guardian powers as it entered
Indian Territory to dismantle the tribal governments, 401 extinguish
land titles,4 2 and divide the land in severalty. °3
More concrete evidence of the racial overtones of guardianship
exists in cases where laws relating to Indians were interpreted by the
courts. Indians were often distinguished in legislation in degree of
Indian blood. Guardianship was held to apply to Indians of full
blood in two Supreme Court cases, 40 4 while it did not, because of
legislative enactment, apply to those of mixed blood. These cases
illustrate that racial distinction alone could be used to uphold re-
strictions on land alienation and allow the United States, as guard-
ian, to enter court and cancel conveyances of allotted land. This
seems to undercut the frequent federal posture that justified guard-
ianship as being in the interest of protecting those who could not
manage their land. The education, culture, and knowledge of prop-
erty matters of the mixed-blood members of a tribe could be ex-
pected to compare to that of the fullbloods. The Court did observe
in one case that the legislative judgment characterizing mixed-bloods
as more capable of managing their own affairs might be mistaken. 0
The facts of the case demonstrated that to be true.400 Yet, the con-
gressional discrimination, sometimes called legislative wisdom, was
upheld by the Supreme Court, and it was based solely on the genetic
heritage of a class of Indians.
Race also surfaced as an issue in criminal jurisdiction cases, es-
pecially after the passage of the Major Crimes Act407 and of liquor
prohibition legislation. 408 In United States v. Celestine,°9 the Court
found that federal jurisdiction extended over an Indian committing
a crime on a reservation, although the land was allotted and the de-
fendant a citizen. The defendant and the victim "remained Indians
by race, ' 41° the Court stated, and even with citizenship, Congress
had not clearly renounced its jurisdiction over the "individual mem-
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bers of this dependent race. ' 411 Restrictive legislation denied the
Indian access to alcohol purely on a racial basis. Race or color was
said to be significant in one liquor case412 because the Indians, as
wards of the government, were the intended beneficiaries of laws
to protect them from liquor.1 8 However, the race of the seller did
not matter.
414
When In re Heff415 held that guardianship was ended by citizen-
ship, Justice Brewer was surely unaware of how well his rhetorical
question4'1 in the decision summarized the racial overtones of guard-
ianship. The United States had argued in Heft that it could punish
a liquor sale between state citizens if the purchaser was an Indian,
although it claimed no such police power if neither party to the sale
was an Indian. If the government claimed this power, although the
Indian had become subject to the civil and criminal laws of a state,
Brewer reasoned that the logic implied that the United States could
never release itself from the obligation of guardianship.417 Congress,
it appeared, could repudiate the granting of all rights and privileges
of national (and therefore state) citizenship and reassume guardian-
ship at its will.418 The Indians would thus be denied the benefits
of the laws of the states where they resided.419 "Can it be that be-
cause one has Indian, and only Indian blood in his veins, he is to be
forever one of a special class over whom the General Government
may in its discretion assume the rights of guardianship which it has
once abandoned," Brewer asked, "and this whether the State or the
individual himself consents?
' '420
The cases betveen 1887 and 1924 provide an affirmative answer to
that question. Heft, and Justice Brewer's point of view, were but mo-
mentary diversions from the clear path of decisions which led the
Indian into the ever-restricting web of federal guardianship. Even
before Heft was overruled,421 the final answer was plain. The govern-
ment could, in its discretion, and because of its superior strength, as-
sume the rights of guardianship over a special class: those who had
Indian, and only Indian, blood in their veins.
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4. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). In this case,
Chief Justice Marshall was called upon to determine the character of Indian title to
occupied land. The terms "occupancy" and "possession" are interchangeably used
to describe the Indian right in the land, but Marshall reached the conclusion that
Indian title was not a fee such as to give a right of alienability. Apparently, Marshall
hoped to lay to rest the whole question of Indian versus United States title to land
by a very long, historically documented opinion tracing federal power as sovereign
back to the fifteenth century. Although territory was occupied by Indians, ". . . the
exclusive right of the United States to extinguish their title . . . has never, we be-
lieve, been doubted." Id. at 584. Significantly, the issue was not settled by the John-
son case, but the opinion "substantially compromised" the Indian interest. See,
Swindler, Politics as Law: The Cherokee Cases, 3 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 7, 10-11
(1975). Even before the Johnson case reached the Supreme Court, some recognition
of Indian possessory rights, based on prior occupancy, was evidenced in reports of
the government officials charged with formulating Indian policy. G. HARMON, SIXTY
YEARS OF INDiAN AFFAIRS 55 (194-1).
5. Two references to Indians appear in the body of the Constitution. In appor-
tioning representatives, "Indians not taxed" were to be excluded in the count. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2. Congress was given the power to "regulate commerce . . . with
the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
6. 318 U.S. 375 (1886).
7. Id. at 378.
8. S. TYLER, A HISTORY OF INDIAN POLICY 37 (1973) [hereinafter cited as TYLER].
It should be noted that Indian-white conflict had been a problem from the earliest
days of the American colonies, but by 1789 there was a century-old history of white
dealings with the North American Indians. Trade, land encroachment, war, treaties,
and Indian removal were established concepts by the time the Constitution was
written and Indian policy invited no special attention in the document. See generally,
W. JAcoBs, DISPOSSESSING THE AmERICAN INDIAN, INDIANS AND WInTES ON TIE
COLONIAL FRONTIER (1972).
9. Courts at various times defined the Indian tribes as having a "national charac-
ter" or being a "nation of people," Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757, 760
(1866); or as "foreign states . . . alien nations, distinct political communities," or
"independent political communities." Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 99, 109 (1884).
The Kagama Court determined that while regarded as having a "semi-dependcnt
position," Indian tribes were not nations and not possessed of the full attributes of
sovereignty, but that they were a separate people not brought under the laws of the
Union or any state. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). Yet, the In-
dians' existence as a separate and a distinct people with rights which constituted them
as states or separate communities was recognized, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
'Pet.) 515, 583 (1832), although tribes still fell short of being sovereign nations.
,Cherokee Nation v. Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (189o).
1o. See generally, F. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1921).
Turner describes the long-held American belief that the frontier would always be
available for new settlement and expansion.
11. Numerous treaties pledged land to the Indians in perpetuity. See INDIAN
TREATIES (C. Kappler com. 1972). An example of the perpetuity covenant is found
in Treaty with the Western Cherokees, art. 2, 7 Stat. 311 (1828): "The United
'States agree to possess the Cherokees, and to guarantee it to them forever, and that
guarantee is hereby solemnly pledged, seven million acres of land . . . and . . . a
perpetual outlet .. " Article 8 of the treaty states that the Cherokees "and their
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posterity" will be freed from the "harassing and ruinous effects consequent upon
location amidst a white population."
12. Typically, early Indian treaties included the drawing of a line beyond which
the Indians were to stay and the white settlers were not to enter. W. JAcoBs,
DISPOSSESSING THE AmERICAN INDIAN, INDIANS AND WHITES ON THE COLONIAL
FRONTIER 98-101 (1972). The colonial precedent for this policy is discussed in
TYLER, supra note 8, at 29-30.
13. The United States followed the British practice of making treaties with the
"Indian nations." B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AmERICAN REvo-
LUTION 223-29 (1967). See the discussion of colonial treaty practices and the con-
cept of protectorate status over the tribes in TYLER, supra note 8, at 7-31. Flowing
from the recognition of tribal sovereignty was the vesting of the power to govern
relations with the Indians in the federal government, rather than individual state
government. This principle was established by the Continental Congress and was
carried over into the Constitution. F. PRucHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE
FORMATIVE YEARS 6-25 (1962). Prucha's analysis of the flow of power should be
questioned in light of the theory that tribal sovereignty was only recognized by the
United States in terms of its own definition of that sovereignty. This idea is expanded
on in the "Tribal Status and Indian Sovereignty" section of this article.
14. The military conquest of the Plains tribes was the turning point in the final
destruction of an independent Indian civilization in this country. A contemporary
account of the military campaigns against the "savage" tribes appears in G. MANY-
PENNY, OUR INDIAN WARDS (.88o). A recent work on the federal taking of Indian
lands is K. KICKINGBmn & K. DUCHENEAUX, ONE HUNDRED MILLION ACRES (1973)
[hereinafter cited as K. KICKINGBIRD].
15. Some of the best examples of the insistent and articulate reform literature of
the assimilation movement is found in F. PRuciA, AmERICANIZING THE AMERICAN
INDIAN: WRITINGS BY THE "FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN" 1880-19OO (1973). While
assimilation propaganda reached its apex in the post-Civil War period and had the
greatest influence on public thinking and national policy during this time, the idea
was not a new one. In 182o, John C. Calhoun had stated that the American Indian
should be "brought gradually under our authority and laws .... It is impossible with
their customs, that they should exist as independent communities in the midst of
civilized society." AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, Indian Affairs, No. 162, 2oo-2ol. [here-
inafter cited as AMERICAN STATE PAPERS]. In the colonial period, Harvard, William
and Mary, and Dartmouth colleges all expressed an interest in educating Indian youth
so that they could "take their place" in American society. ADMINISTRATION OF THE
INDIAN OFFICE, No. 65,12 (1915).
16. The policy of enforced acculturation exemplifies, perhaps more tragically than
any other reform effort that has been forced upon the American Indian, the abuses
of a dominant and self-righteous society set loose upon a minority culture and bent
upon remaking that culture in its own image. The arrogance of a society that con-
sidered itself civilized in the extreme, Victorian morality, and the convictions of a
Christian people combined to do battle with and solve, once and for all, the "Indian
problem." The ultimate solution was believed to lie in the destruction of the language,
religious customs, and attitudes that made Indians different. Once the differences
were eliminated, Indians would be like all other Americans and the problems of an
alien culture within the United States would be solved. Boarding schools, to get chil-
dren away from the "bad influence" of home, were established. Native customs and
religious ceremonies were banned on reservations. Rigid discipline and enforced work
routines were imposed to impart the American work ethic. Language, dress, and hair-
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style was Americanized. A contemporary account appears in COMMISSIONER or IN-
DIAN AFFAIRS, ANNUAL REPORT 1O-11 (1872).
17. The passage of the General Allotment Act, Act of Feb. 88, 1887, ch. 119, 24
STAT. 388, best demonstrates the determination to use land ownership as the means
of assimilating the Indians. Enthusiasts expected the Act to result in the "total
fusion . . .of the white and red races," and predicted an Indian assimilation com-
parable with that of other ethnic groups in America. W. BARROWS, THE INDIAN's
SIDE OF THE INDIAN QUESTION 6 (1887). See also Special Subcomm. on Indian Educ.,
Comm. on Labor 6 Public Welfare, Indian Educ.: A National Tragedy-A National
Challenge, S. REP. No. 501, 9ist Cong. 1st Sess., 9 (1969).
18. The practice officially ended with the enactment of a law stating that no Indian
nation or tribe within the territory of the United States would be acknowledged or
'recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States
could contract by treaty. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 12o, 16 Stat. 566.
19. A former Commissioner of Indian Affairs described the assumption of re-
sponsibility over individuals as "a comprehensive guardianship over the persons of
individual Indians." Address by Philleo Nash, Dec. 6, 1962, in THE INDIAN IN AMER-
ICA'S PAST 131 (J. Forbes ed. 1964). The federal superintendence over individual
Indians was probably an inevitable corollary to the assimilation policy and its at-
tendant termination of tribal entities having power to act for Indian groups. Johnson,
Sovereignty, Citizenship and the Indian, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 973, 988-89 (1973). The
Supreme Court stressed the right of Congress to enact protective legislation for In-
dians in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The power of Congress over
Indians has been called a "political" one not subject to control by the courts. Until
Congress declares that government guardianship over the Indians shall cease, its full
and exclusive legislative power over them continues. The power has been described
as not resting on any specific grant of legislative authority, but on the implied au-
thority which subjects the conduct of dependent persons to governmental tutelage.
Pound, Nationals without a Nation: The New York Tribal Indians, 22 COLUms. L.
REV. 97, io2 (1922). ".... [J]urisdiction has been taken by Congress in many matters
which appear to be removed from the matters of commerce with Indians tribes."
Knoepfler, Legal Status of American Indian and His Property, 7 IOWA L. BULL.
232, 234 (1922). See also the sources of congressional power described in United
Statesv. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 34 (1913).
20. Jacob, Uncle Sam-The Great White Father, 23 CASE & COMMENT 703, 705
(1917); U.S. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF TIIE
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND OF INDIAN POLICY 6 (1956). Most of the militarily
conquered Indians were reduced to what has been called "law imposed pauperism."
The federal government was unwilling to "deliberately starve" the Indians after de-
priving them of the means to continue an independent existence, so a ration system
was devised to supply food and other necessities. F. LEUPP, THE INDIAN AND HIs
PROBLEM 26 (191o).
21. The guardianship terminology is generally cited as originating in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), wherein Chief Justice Marshall
analogized the relationship of the federal government to the Indian as like unto a
guardian to his ward. Id. at 21. Nine years earlier, however, Marshall had written
that the laws of the United States treated Indians "as an inferior race of people...
under the perpetual protection and pupilage of the government." Johnson v. Mc-
Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 567 (1823). Earlier still, John C. Calhoun had
written that the Indians ". . . should be taken under our guardianship; and our
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opinions, not theirs, ought to prevail, in measures intended for their civilization and
happiness." A&IERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 35.
22. Congressional power to legislate for American Indians has been held to flow
from one of five sources: first, the treaty-making power; second, the power to regulate
interstate commerce; third, the power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes; fourth,
the ownership as sovereign of lands to which Indian title has not been extinguished;
fifth, the plenary authority arising out of the nation's guardianship of the Indians as
an alien but dependent people. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 34 (1913)-
The first three sources of power are based on constitutional powers granted to Con-
gress. The remaining two are constructed powers and have been used to deal with
almost every facet of the lives of the Native American population.
23. Fifty-two cases, decided within the thirty-six years inclusive of 1887 to 1924,
were studied for their use of guardianship principles in upholding federal power over
Indian affairs. Fifteen landmark cases decided prior to 1887 were also consulted. Of
the 52 principal cases, 33 were decisions of the United States Supreme Court, eight
were decided by a Circuit Court of Appeals, seven by federal district courts, two by
the Court of Claims, and two by territorial courts. The facts giving rise to the cases
varied. Seventeen grew out of criminal charges and criminal jurisdictional questions,
two were tax related, io presented Indian claims, and four involved railroad-Indian
land disputes. The remaining number of cases originated from contested land
conveyances selling or leasing Indian land or land formerly under Indian
control. The cases were analyzed for their use of private law concepts in defining the
federal responsibility to Indians and 35 cases were found to be on point. Twenty-
seven cases discussed the nature of Indian title to land and 14 dealt with questions of
Indian tribal sovereignty and status. Forty-three of the 5z cases contained language
directed at defining, limiting, or enlarging the role of the federal government as
guardian or trustee and confirming the Indian status as a ward of the government.
24. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 568 (1823), quoted at note
21 supra.
25. Private law is used here to mean law as administered betveen citizen and
citizen.
26. Note, Indian Tribal Trust Funds, 27 HAsTINGs L.J. 519 (1975).
27. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of Federal Trust Responsibility, 27 STAN. L.
Rnv. 1213, 1215 (1975).
28. There is no doubt that the guardian is in one of those intimate relations usually
called fiduciary and that he therefore is in the same class with the trustee. G.G.
BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES § 13, at 59 (2d ed. 196o) [here-
inafter cited as BOGERT].
29. Blackfeather v. United States, 28 Ct. CL. 447 (1893); Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 222 (1887).
30. United States v. Flournoy, 69 F. 866 (D. Neb. 1895); United States v. Boyd,
68 F. 577 (W.D.N.C. 1895).
31. United States v. Allen, 179 F. 13 (8th Cir. 191o).
32. Id.at 16.
33. Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912 ).
34. BOGERT, supra note 28.
35- Id., §§ 1-13.
36. Id., § i, at 5"
37. Id.
38. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of Federal Trust Responsibility, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 1213 (1975).
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39. Blackfeather v. United States, 28 Ct. CL. 447 (1893), and Chicksaw Nation
v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 222 (1887) are examples from the cases presented here.
40. Chicksaw Nation v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 222, 225 (1887).
41. BOGERT, supra note 28, § 13, at 59, 6i.
42. Id. at 58-59.
43. Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923); United States v. Waller, 243
U.S. 452 (1917); Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1916) (United States
intervened by leave of the Court); Bowling v. United States, 233 U.S. 528 (1914);
Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912); Mullen v. United States, 224 U.S.
448 (1912); Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553 (1903); United States v. Rickert, i88 U.S. 432 (1903); Cherokee Nation
v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (19o2); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445
(1899).
44. A variety of definitions, assumptions, and conclusions can be drawn from the
way in which the courts have expressed the nature of the guardian-ward relationship
between the United States and Indians. FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 557-66 (1958) [here-
inafter cited as FEDERAL INDrAN LAW].
45. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S.
665 (1912); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912); Wallace v. Adams,
204 U.S. 415 (1907); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Stephens v.
Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S. 445 (1899).
46. BOGERT, supra note 28, § 13, at 59-
47- Id., § 14, at 63.
48. "It is not within the power of the Courts to overrule the judgment of Con-
gress." The power of Congress to continue or abandon its guardianship over Indians is
unquestioned. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 290 (1909).
49- "The power existing in Congress to administer upon and guard the tribal
property ... the manner of its exercise is a question within the province of the legis-
lative branch . . . and is not one for the courts." Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 294, 308 (1902).
50. 22 Ct. Cl. 222 (1887).
51. Id. at 248.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 24 9.
54. Id. at 265.
55. Blackfeather v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 447 (1893).
56. Id. at 461.
57- Id. at 456.
58. Id. at 46o.
59. 68 F. 577 (W.D.N.C. 189 5).
6o. Id. at 579, 580, 583.
61. Id. at 579.
62. 69 F. 886 (D. Neb. 1895).
63. Id. at 89o-91.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Berrigan, 2 Alas. 442 (1905).
66. Id. at 443-44.
67. i87 U.S. 29 4 (1 9 o2).
68. Id. at 3o7.
69. Id. at 308.
70. United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 442 (1903) .
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71. Id. at 4 44.
72. Id. at 436.
73. Id. at 443.
74. 204 U'S' 458 (1907).
75. Act of Aug. 35, 1894, ch. 290, 28 Stat. 286.
76. McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458, 468 (1907).
77. Act of Feb. 6, 191o, ch. 217, 31 Stat. 76o, amending 28 Stat. 286.
78. McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458, 469 (1907).
79. The Eighth Circuit made a distinction in Mulligan v. United States, 12o F.
98 (8th Cir. 1903), between an Indian under wardship and an Indian vho came
under federal supervision because his land was held in trust. After the Eighth Circuit
determined in United States v. Allen, 179 F. 13 (8th Cir. 191o), that the private
law of guardian did not apply in Indian cases, it scrupulously avoided the use of the
terms "guardian," "trustee," and "ward" in writing the subsequent decision in United
States v. Fitzgerald, 201 F. 295 (8th Cir. 1912) and United States v. Gray, 2o F.
291 (8th Cir. 1912).
8o. The Eighth Circuit strongly supported the right of the United States to come
into court to protect and further the aims of its Indian policy. The court stressed the
dependence and susceptibility of Indians in Beck v. Flournoy, 65 F. 30 (8th Cir.
1894); found that citizenship of the Indian did not prevent Congress from prohibiting
liquor sales to them in Mulligan v. United States, 12o F. 98 (8th Cir. 1903); that the
Indian dependence allowed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to act for their pro-
tection in Rainbow v. Young, 161 F. 835 (8th Cir. 19o8); that allottees were not
necessary parties in a suit brought by the United States to protect allottee land in
United States v. Allen, 179 F. 13 (8th Cir. 191o); that theft of the personal property
of an allottee infringed on federal rights and the means of carrying out Indian policies
so as to give the government a cause of action for damages for wrongful taking in
United States v. Fitzgerald, 2ol F. 295 (8th Cir. 1912); and that the civil or political
status of the Indian does not condition the power of the government to protect Indian
property rights and carry out policies to civilize the Indian, United States v. Gray,
201 F. 29 1 (8th Cir. 19 12).
81. 179 F. 13, 36 (8th Cir. 191o).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 22.
84. Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912).
85. Id. at 416-20.
86. Id. at 436.
87. Id. at 445.
88. Id.
89. Deming Inv. Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 471 (1912); Goat v. United
States, 224 U.S. 458 (1912); Mullen v. United States, 224 U.S. 448 (1912).
9o.Wise, Indian Law and Needed Reforms, 12 A.B.A.J. 37 (1926). If the recog-
nition afforded the Indian tribes by the federal government is considered to be that
of one sovereign acknowledging another, the very unusual and "solecistic relationship
of imperium in imperio-a sovereign within a sovereign," was created. Johnson,
Sovereignty, Citizenship and the Indian, 15 ARiz. L. REv. 973-74 (1973)- See B.
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AmERIcAN REVOLUTION (1967).
91. A. SNow, THE QUESTION OF ABORIGINES IN THE LA-W AND PRACTICE OF
NATIONS 29-30, 55 (1921).
9z. Wise, Indian Law and Needed Reforms, 12 A.B.A.J. 37, 90 (1926). Tribal
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status gave rise to "unique rights" for Indians. E. SCHUSKY, THE RIGHT To BE AN
INDIAN 55 (1970).
93" It has been called "modem practice" to "discourage tribal organization and
to deal with the aborigines as individuals under guardianship." A. SNow, TIE QuEs-
'noN OF AiORIGINES IN THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF NATIONS (191). Parallels have
been drawn between the American experience with the Indians and other situations
where the government has had a guardianship responsibility. The United States'
naval administration of Micronesia under United Nations trusteeship and the War
Location Authority's management of relocated Japanese-Americans during the Second
World War have been cited as being analogous. The French in Indo-China, the
Japanese in Formosa, and the British in the West Indies have demonstrated "social
characteristics" similar to the Americans in managing indigenous populations. In every
instance, "the administrator... regards himself smarter than the people he is guiding
and so better equipped to make policy decisions on their behalf. The administrator
also feels he is protecting his people against sinister outside forces .... Embree, The
Indian Bureau and Self Government, 8 HuMAw ORGANIZATION No. 2, at I I (1949).
94. The viewpoint expressed here is in no way intended as a justification of the
acts described or as a vindication of the "might makes right" philosophy. It is an
effort to survey the political facts in a dispassionate manner and leave moral judg-
ments to the discretion of the individual reader.
95. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 44, at 152-53. See generally, Canfield, The
Legal Position of the Indian, 15 AM. L. REV. 21 (1881).
96. A contemporary critic of the policies leading to the Cherokee removal from
the eastern states strongly argued that treaties and executive conduct toward Indian
tribes constituted a stipulation which would estop the United States from denying
Indian nationhood. "We should be obliged to submit to the inconvenience resulting
from our stipulations .. " J. EVARTs, EssAYs ON THE PRESENT CRISIS AND CONDI-
TION OF THE AMERICAN INDIANS 21 (1829). Rarely do sovereign nations willingly
"submit to inconvenience" when they have the power to do otherwise and wish to
achieve a national policy goal. In this instance, the goal was Indian removal from
desired land. Whatever the moral considerations, the United States meant to achieve
that goal and had the power to do so.
97. TYLER, supra note 8, at 27-30.
98. Id. at 30. The early protective policy of the United States toward Indians was
pronounced by George Washington in 1790: "The General Government will never
consent to your being defrauded, but will protect you in all your just rights." AMERI-
CAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 15, at 142.
99. TYLER, supra note 8, at 23-31.
ioo. Id. at 30. BlAcK's LAW DICTIONARY defines sovereignty as "the possession
of sovereign power; supreme political authority . . . the international independence
of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without
foreign dictation .. "
101. TYLER, supra note 8, at 30.
io2. Total independence of Indian tribes has not existed since the founding of the
unerican government. Canfield, The Legal Position of the Indian, 15 Ama. L. REV.
22, 23 (i88i).
1o3. If the power over Indian affairs is properly characterized as external in nature,
constitutional authority for the wide range of powers assumed over the Indian is not
required; the power is an attribute of national sovereignty. Johnson, Sovereignty,
Citizenship and the Indian, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 973, 981 (1973).
104. Court recognition came in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)
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and Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.s. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). Legislative recognition
can be implied from the willingness of Congress to leave Indians outside the scope of
legislative acts for almost 1o years. Treaties and acts passed by Congress have at times
specifically recognized trial governmental power. FEDERAL INDIAN LA-w, supra note
44, at 402-10.
1o5. Justice Marshall stated that the tribes were not foreign nations in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 23 (1831 ).
io6. Indian tribes have controlled tribal membership, regulated domestic rela-
tions, controlled descent and distribution of property, taxed themselves, and admin-
istered justice. FEDERAL INDrAN LAw, supra note 44, at 413-52.
107. Id. at 773-76. Allotments were provided for as early as 1798 in treaties, but it
was not until the 185o's that allotment became a pattern. All earlier legislation was
capstoned by the General Allotment Act of 1887.
Lo8. Id. at 774. The 1958 revision of Cohen's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW states that ". . . [AIllotment came to be used in connection with terminating
tribal status. Allottees surrendered their interest in the tribal estate and became
citizens." This view is not supported by the major case interpreting the effect of
allotment and citizenship on tribal status. See United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591
(1916) (tribal status continued after allotment and citizenship).
109. OTIs, supra note 2, at 8-32. Otis discusses some of the congressional debate
on the General Allotment Act. While the benefits of the land severalty plan were
stressed, there was a minority view claiming that the real aim of the bill was to get
land away from the Indian and open it for white settlement. Id. at 19.
11o. Wigganv.Conolly, 163 U.S. 56, 6o (1896).
iIi. Id. at 6z.
112. Congress particularly demonstrated that it would not free the Indian from
laws restraining liquor sales, which was the substantive issue in several cases involving
the effect of allotments. The Eighth Circuit summarized the matter: ". . . [U]nder
all the changes of policy with reference to the Indians for more than a century there
has been but one sentiment as to the debauching effect of intoxicating liquors upon
this primitive people, and but one purpose on the part of Congress, and that has been
to absolutely suppress the traffic with them and shield them from its debasing in-
fluences." United States Exp. Co. v. Friedman, 191 F. 673 (8th Cir. 1911).
113. 197U.S. 4 88 (1905).
114. Id. at499.
115. Id. at 501-502. "... [Tihe policy of the government has changed, and ... an
effort is being made to relieve some of the Indians from their tutelage and endow them
with the full rights of citizenship, thus terminating between them and the Govern-
ment the relation of guardian and ward. .. ."
116. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916), which overruled Heff, sum-
marized the Court's reconsideration: ". . . the tribal relation and the wardship of
the Indians were not to be disturbed by the allotments, . . . we find that both Con-
gress and the Administrative Officers of the Government have proceeded upon that
theory." Id. at 6oi.
117. Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478 (1914); United States v. Sandoval, 231
U.S. 28 (1913); Tiger v. Western Inv., 221 U.S. 286 (1911); United States v.
Celestine, 215 U.S. 287 (19o9); United States Exp. Co. v. Friedman, 119 F. 673
(8th Cir. 1911); United States v. Allen, 179 F. 13 (8th Cir. 191o); Rainbow v.
Young, 161 F. 835 (8th Cir. 19o8).
118. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 287, 289-9o (19o9).
119. Rainbow v. Young, 161 F. 835, 836 (8th Cir. 19o8).
237
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1976
12o. Perrin v. United States, 232 U.S. 478, 487 (1914). In overruling Heft, the
Court said that the tribal relation continued after guardianship, and "nothing is
found to indicate that it was to terminate short of the trust period." United States v.
Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 596 (1916).
121. United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 5 9 9 -
124. Id.
1z5. Id. at 6oi.
126. 318 U.S. 375 (3886). It should be noted that Heft, Nice, and related cases
dealt with the control of liquor sales to Indians, and thus the "necessity" of interpret-
ing tribal status could be attributed to the phraseology of statutes on that subject.
127. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 361. The Act extended federal criminal
law to all Indian reservations.
128. 138 U.S. 375, 378 (1886).
129. Id. at 383.
130. Id. at 383-85.
131. Id. at 384.
132. Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
133. Id. at 657.
134. Id. at 6 5 3 -5 4 .
135. Id.
136. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
137- Id. at 3o7-
138. Id. at 307-3o8.
139. Id. at 3o7.
140. Id. at 3o6-307.
141. 18 7 U'S" 5 5 3 (1903)-
142. Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517 (1887); Leavenworth R.R. v. United
States, 92 U.S. 733 (1875); United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591 (1873);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (18z3)
143- _87 U.S. 553, 565 (1903).
144. Id. at 564-65.
145. Id. at 565.
146. Id. at 564. Congress would not have to gain the assent of the Indians to act
in regard to land in the case of a "possible emergency."
147. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 566.
148. F. LEUPP, THE INDIAN AND His PROBLEM (1910).
149. F. PRUCHA, AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIAN: WnRINcs BY THE
"FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN" 1880-1900 (1973). Those who considered themselves In-
dian "friends" rarely suggested that the native culture offered something worth pre-
serving. There were several competing ideas on how best to change the life and
habits of the Indian, but all agreed that something should be done "for" the Indian.
[n United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1885), the Court found a government
duty arising out of the "very weakness and helplessness" of the Indians, which was
"'so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them.
Id. at 384.
15o. The growth of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the history of services offered
Indians is discussed in FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 44, at 215-306.
151. Some important Indian land studies are: J. BENNETT, THE LAw OF TITLES
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TO INDIAN LAND (1917); S. BLEDSOE, INDIAN LAND LAvs (19o9); W. BLUMENTHAL,
AMERICAN INDIANS DISPOSSESSED (1955); K. KICKINGBIRD & K. DUCHENEAUX, ONE
HUNDRED MILLION ACRES (1973); C. ROYCE, INDIAN LAND CESSIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES (1900).
152. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); KICKINGBIRD, Supra
note 14, at 4-5-
153. Johnson v. Mclntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
154. Id.
155. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6Pet.) 515 (1832).
156. Early acts of the United States Congress were aimed at protecting the Indian
in his possessory right. Trespass on Indian land was punishable by acts passed in 1790
through 1834, the latter law being made permanent. Other laws passed in 1867, 1884,
and 1891 had the same thrust. Courts also strongly upheld Indian possession against
interlopers. FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 44, at 633-38.
157. TYLER, supra note 8, at 34-35-
158. Although formal consent was usually obtained from the Indians when land
was taken, "it is well known that they ... yielded to a necessity to which they could
not resist." U.S. BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, cited supra note 2o, at 6.
159. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 44, at 174-75.
16o. Id. at 773-74. Originally, allotment was a form of reserving land to individual
members of a tribe when chiefs or councils of the tribe entered into treaties of land
cession. The plots of land upon which individuals had settled or made improvements
were reserved from the land cession and allotted to the individuals.
161. Contemporary writers could not find enough superlatives to describe the social
miracle that general allotment would bring about. The settling of Indians on their
own land and the granting of citizenship was seen as the final stage of the "civilizing"
process. Judges were not immune from the fever. Land division in severalty would
end the "indolence and shiftlessness" that had characterized Indian behavior, United
States v. Kiya, 126 F. 879, 881 (D.N.D. 1903); it would cause Indians to "adopt
the habits of an agricultural people," Hy-Yu-Tse-Mil-kin v. Smith, 194 U.S. 401, 412
(1904); and teach the "arts of civilized life," United States v. Gray, 2o F. 291, 293
(8th Cir. 1912), thereby advancing the Indian from his "semi-savage condition,"
United States v. Flournoy, 69 F. 886, 891 (D. Neb. 1895). Theodore Roosevelt more
bluntly described the General Allotment Act as "a mighty pulverizing engine to break
up the tribal mass." L. TYLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: A WoRK PAPER ON TERMINATION 5
(1964).
162. FEDERAL INDAN LAW, supra note 44, at 710-11.
163. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294 (19o2); Cherokee Nation v.
Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (189o). The latter case is particularly revealing
of the intent to handle Indian land as desired, despite earlier guarantees. The Court
upheld the power of Congress to grant land to the railroad in an area that had been
secured to the Cherokee Nation under treaties guaranteeing title, possession, and
jurisdiction to the tribe. Simple eminent domain principles should have sufficed to
reach the desired result, but the Court went one step further. "It would be very
strange if the national government... could not exercise eminent domain . . . power
in a Territory occupied by an Indian nation or tribe, the members of which were
wards of the United States, and directly subject to its political control." Id. at 656-57.
3.64. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 1.87 U.S. 553 (1903)-
165. KICKINCBIRD, supra note 14, at 7- In the cases studied, one mention of
constitutional limits on federal powers was made. This diversion from the general rule
actually worked to further federal guardianship by extending protection from state
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taxation to Indian groups in Oklahoma. In reaching this result, it was necessary for
the Supreme Court to overrule an act of Congress so the law was found to be un-
constitutional. The case was grounded on fifth amendment protections of property
rights. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 678 (1912). The Choate opinion is strangely
out of tempo with every other case during the period. It was rendered in its style and
approach as a contracts question. The idiosyncrasies of Justice Lamar, who wrote the
opinion, provide one possible explanation. Lamar came to the Supreme Court from
Georgia, where he had gained a reputation for his contract decisions while on the
state supreme court. 3 JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT (1969), at 1974-76.
166. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,
174 U.S. 4 4 5 (1899)-
167. Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437-38 (1912).
168. The power of Congress to establish a commission to determine tribal mem-
bership for purposes of land distribution is constitutional. Stephens v. Cherokee Na-
tion, 174 U.S. 4 4 5 (1899).
169. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Cherokee Nation v. Hitch-
cock, 187 U.S. 294 (1902).
170. Bowling v. United States, 233 U.S. 528 (1914); Monson v. Simonson, 231
U.S. 341 (1913); Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 613 (1913); Jones v. Meeham, 175
U.S. 1 (1899); Wiggan v. Conolly, 163 U.S. 56 (1896).





176. Id. at 442-44.
177. 224 U.S. 665 (1912).
178. Id. at 667.
179. Allotment of land belonging to the Five Civilized Tribes was provided for
by the Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495; Act of July 1, 1902, chs. 1362,
1363, 32 STAT. 641, 657.
18o. Act of June 28, 1898, ch. 517, 30 STAT. 507.
181. 224 U.S. 665, 670 (1912).
182. Act of May 27, 19o8, ch. 199, 35 Stat. 312.
183. 22 4 U.S. 665, 671 (1912).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 672.
186. Id. at 673.
187. Id. at 677-78. Choate actually worked to enlarge federal guardianship by
protecting Indians from state taxation, but the Court claimed that it had to overrule
the legislation allowing Indian land to be taxed because it exceeded federal plenary
powers. Clearly, the Act of May 27, 19o8, would have allowed the state of Okla-
homa to tax some Indian land. This enactment was out of the ordinary pattern of
protecting Indians from the burdens imposed by a state. It required imaginative
reasoning, but the Choate Court found a way to continue the tradition of protection.
188. 2o4 U.S. 458 (1907).
189. Id. at46o-61.
19o. Id. at 467-69.
191. Id. at466.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 469.
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194. 9 5 U.S. 517 (1877).
195. Id. at 525.
196. Id. at 523.
197. Id. at 525 .
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Leavenworth R.R. v. United States, 9z U.S. 733 (1875)-
201. Id. at 742.
2oz. Id.
203. Id. at 742-43.
204. Id. at 74 3-
205. Id. at 744.
206. Id. at 74 3-
207. 95 U.S. 517, 526 (1877).
208. 68 F. 577 (W.D.N.C. 1895).
209. Id. at 578.
21o. Id. at 578-79.




215. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 389.
216. Id.
217. BLAck's LAw DICTIONARY ( 4th ed. 1951).
218. 188U.S. 4 32,4 36 (1903).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 389.
222. z 33 U.S. 341 (1913).
223. Id. at 345
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. 65 F. 30 (8th Cir. 1894).
227. Id. at 35. Presumably, the land interest was not diminished by easements or
other estates.
228. Id.
229. Id. The Flournoy Company continued its efforts to gain leases on restricted
land, despite the ruling in Beck. Subsequent to Beck, the United States brought suit to
restrain further leasing activities. United States v. Floumoy, 69 F. 886 (D. Neb.
1895). In that case the Indian was deemed to have a right to present possession (at
89o) in his allotted land, but in its duty as guardian, the federal government was
entitled to restrict alienation. Id. at 893. Again, the real estate company argued that
allotment in severalty and citizenship ended the federal guardianship. Id. at 891. The
court affirmed that restriction and citizenship could coexist. Id. at 891.
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